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vRésumé
Dans le sillage de la récession mondiale de 2008-09, plusieurs questions ont
été soulevées dans la littérature économique sur les effets à court et à long
terme de la politique budgétaire sur l’activité économique par rapport à son
signe, sa taille et sa durée. Ceux-ci ont des implications importantes pour
mieux comprendre les canaux de transmission et l’efficacité des politiques
budgétaires, avec la politique monétaire étant poursuivi, ainsi que pour leurs
retombées économiques.
Cette thèse fait partie de ce regain d’intérêt de la littérature d’examiner
comment les changements dans la politique budgétaire affectent l’activité
économique. Elle repose alors sur trois essais: les effets macroéconomiques
des chocs de dépenses publiques et des recettes fiscales, les résultats macro-
économiques de l’interaction entre les politiques budgétaire et monétaire et
le lien entre la politique budgétaire et la répartition des revenus.
Le premier chapitre examine les effets des chocs de politique budgétaire
(chocs de dépenses publiques et chocs de recettes fiscales) sur l’économie
canadienne au cours de la période 1970-2010, en s’appuyant sur la méth-
ode d’identification des restrictions de signe développée par Mountford and
Uhlig [2009]. En réponse à la récession mondiale, les autorités fiscales dans
les économies avancées, dont le Canada ont généralement mis en œuvre une
approche en deux phases pour la politique budgétaire. Tout d’abord, ils ont
introduit des plans de relance sans précédent pour relancer leurs économies.
Par exemple, les mesures de relance au Canada, introduites à travers le Plan
d’action économique du Canada, ont été projetées à 3.2 pour cent du PIB
dans le budget fédéral de 2009 tandis que l’ "American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act"(ARRA) a été estimé à 7 pour cent du PIB. Par la suite, ils ont
mis en place des plans d’ajustement en vue de réduire la dette publique et
en assurer la soutenabilité à long terme. Dans ce contexte, évaluer les effets
multiplicateurs de la politique budgétaire est important en vue d’informer sur
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l’efficacité de telles mesures dans la relance ou non de l’activité économique.
Les résultats montrent que les multiplicateurs d’impôt varient entre 0.2 et
0.5, tandis que les multiplicateurs de dépenses varient entre 0.2 et 1.1. Les
multiplicateurs des dépenses ont tendance à être plus grand que les multipli-
cateurs des recettes fiscales au cours des deux dernières décennies.
Comme implications de politique économique, ces résultats tendent à sug-
gérer que les ajustements budgétaires par le biais de grandes réductions de
dépenses publiques pourraient être plus dommageable pour l’économie que
des ajustements budgétaires par la hausse des impôts.
Le deuxième chapitre, co-écrit avec Constant Lonkeng Ngouana, estime les
effets multiplicateurs des dépenses publiques aux Etats-Unis en fonction du
cycle de la politique monétaire. Les chocs de dépenses publiques sont identi-
fiés comme étant des erreurs de prévision du taux de croissance des dépenses
publiques à partir des données d’Enquêtes des prévisionnistes professionnels
et des informations contenues dans le "Greenbook". L’état de la politique
monétaire est déduite à partir de la déviation du taux des fonds fédéraux du
taux cible de la Réserve Fédérale, en faisant recours à une fonction lisse de
transition. L’application de la méthode des «projections locales» aux don-
nées trimestrielles américaines au cours de la période 1965-2012 suggère que
les effets multiplicateurs des dépenses fédérales sont sensiblement plus élevées
quand la politique monétaire est accommodante que lorsqu’elle ne l’est pas.
Les résultats suggèrent aussi que les dépenses fédérales peuvent stimuler ou
non la consommation privée, dépendamment du degré d’ accommodation de
la politique monétaire. Ce dernier résultat réconcilie ainsi, sur la base d’ un
cadre unifié des résultats autrement contradictoires à première vue dans la
littérature.
Ces résultats ont d’importantes implications de politique économique. Ils
suggèrent globalement que la politique budgétaire est plus efficace lorsqu’on
en a le plus besoin (par exemple, lorsque le taux de chômage est élevé),
si elle est soutenue par la politique monétaire. Ils ont également des im-
plications pour la normalisation des conditions monétaires dans les pays
avancés: la sortie des politiques monétaires non-conventionnelles conduirait à
des multiplicateurs de dépenses fédérales beaucoup plus faibles qu’autrement,
même si le niveau de chômage restait élevé. Ceci renforce la nécessité d’une
calibration prudente du calendrier de sortie des politiques monétaires non-
conventionnelles.
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Le troisième chapitre examine l’impact des mesures d’expansion et de con-
traction budgétaire sur la distribution des revenus dans un panel de 18 pays
d’Amérique latine au cours de la période 1990-2010, avec un accent sur les
deniers 40 pour cent. Il explore alors comment ces mesures fiscales ainsi
que leur composition affectent la croissance des revenus des dernier 40 pour
cent, la croissance de leur part de revenu ainsi que la croissance économique.
Les mesures d’expansion et de contraction budgétaire sont identifiées par
des périodes au cours desquels il existe une variation significative du déficit
primaire corrigé des variations conjoncturelles en pourcentage du PIB.
Les résultats montrent qu’en moyenne l’expansion budgétaire par la hausse
des dépenses publiques est plus favorable à la croissance des revenus des
moins bien-nantis que celle par la baisse des impôts. Ce résultat est prin-
cipalement soutenu par la hausse des dépenses gouvernementales de con-
sommation courante, les transferts et subventions. En outre ces mesures d’
expansion budgétaire sont favorables à la réduction des inégalités car elle
permettent d’améliorer la part des revenus des moins bien-nantis tout en ré-
duisant la part des revenus des mieux-nantis de la distribution des revenus.
En outre ces mesures d’ expansion budgétaire sont favorables à la réduc-
tion des inégalités car elle permettent d’améliorer la part des revenus des
moins bien-nantis tout en réduisant la part des revenus des mieux-nantis de
la distribution des revenus. Cependant, l’expansion budgétaire pourrait soit
n’avoir aucun effet sur la croissance économique ou entraver cette dernière à
travers la hausse des dépenses en capital. Les résultats relatifs à la contrac-
tion budgétaire sont quelque peu mitigés. Parfois, les mesures de contraction
budgétaire sont associées à une baisse de la croissance des revenus des moins
bien nantis et à une hausse des inégalités, parfois l’impact de ces mesures
est non significatif. Par ailleurs, aucune des mesures n’ affecte de manière
significative la croissance du PIB.
Comme implications de politique économique, les pays avec une certaine
marge de manœuvre budgétaire pourraient entamer ou continuer à mettre en
œuvre des programmes de "filets de sauvetage"–par exemple les programmes
de transfert monétaire conditionnel–permettant aux segments vulnérables
de la population de faire face à des chocs négatifs et aussi d’améliorer leur
conditions de vie. Avec un potentiel de stimuler l’emploi peu qualifié, une re-
lance budgétaire sage par les dépenses publique courantes pourrait également
jouer un rôle important pour la réduction des inégalités. Aussi, pour éviter
que les dépenses en capital freinent la croissance économique, les projets
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d’investissements publics efficients devraient être prioritaires dans le proces-
sus d’élaboration des politiques. Ce qui passe par la mise en œuvre des
projets d’investissement avec une productivité plus élevée capable de générer
la croissance économique nécessaire pour réduire les inégalités.
Mots-clés : Politique budgétaire, effets multiplicateurs de la politique
budgétaire, restrictions de signe, déficits jumeaux, politique monétaire ac-
commodante, projections locales, inégalité des revenus.
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Abstract
In the wake of the 2008-09 Global Recession, several issues have been raised
in the economic literature about the short and long-run effects of fiscal policy
on economic activity with respect to its signs, its size and its duration. These
have important implications to better understand the transmission channels
and the effectiveness of fiscal policies, along with the monetary policy being
pursued, as well as for their economic fallouts.
This dissertation is part of this renewed strand of literature to assess how
changes in fiscal policy affect economic activity. It therefore relies on three
essays: the macroeconomic effects of government spending and tax revenue
shocks, the economic outcomes of the interaction between fiscal and monetary
policies and the nexus between fiscal policy and income distribution.
The first chapter examines the effects of fiscal policy shocks (government
spending and tax revenue shocks) on the Canadian economy, building on the
sign-restrictions-VAR approach developed by Mountford and Uhlig [2009].
In response to the Global Recession, fiscal authorities in advanced economies
including Canada typically implemented a two-phase approach to fiscal pol-
icy. First, they introduced unprecedented stimulus packages to revive their
economies. For instance, stimulus measures in Canada, introduced through
Canada’s Economic Action Plan, were projected at 3.2 percent of GDP in
the 2009 federal budget while the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act(ARRA) was estimated at 7 percent of GDP. Following the stimulus,
they shifted gears, adopting adjustment plans to reduce public debt and en-
sure long-term fiscal sustainability. Against this backdrop, examining the
size of fiscal multiplier is important to informing the effectiveness of such
policy measures in reviving or not economic activity. I find that tax-cut mul-
tipliers vary between 0.2 and 0.5, while spending multipliers range between
0.2 and 1.1. Spending multipliers tend to be larger than tax-cut multipliers
over the last two decades.
xFor policy implications, these results tend to suggest that fiscal consolidations
through large spending cuts could be more harmful to the economy than tax-
based fiscal adjustments.
The second chapter, co-written with Constant Lonkeng Ngouana, provides
estimates of the US government spending multiplier over the monetary pol-
icy cycle. Government spending shocks are identified as forecast errors of
the growth rate of government spending from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) and from the Greenbook record, further stripped from
their predictable components. The state of monetary policy is inferred from
the deviation of the Fed funds rate from the target rate, using a smooth
transition function. Applying the local projections method to quarterly US
data over the period 1965-2012, results show that the federal government
spending multiplier is substantially higher under accommodative than non-
accommodative monetary policy. The estimations also suggest that federal
government spending may crowd-in or crowd-out private consumption, de-
pending on the extent of monetary policy accommodation. The latter result
reconciles—in a unified framework—apparently contradictory findings in the
literature.
These findings have important policy implications. They broadly suggest
that fiscal policy is more effective when needed the most (e.g., at times of
slack), if supported by monetary policy. They also have implications for the
normalization of monetary conditions in advanced economies: the exit from
UMP would lead to much lower federal government spending multipliers than
otherwise, even if some amount of slack was to remain in the economy. This
further highlights the need for a careful calibration of the timing of exit from
unconventional monetary policy.
The third chapter examines the impact of fiscal expansion and fiscal con-
traction measures on income distribution in a panel of 18 Latin American
countries over the period 1990-2010, with a focus on the bottom 40 per-
cent. It therefore explores how these fiscal measures and their composition
have affected the income growth of the bottom 40 percent, their income
share growth and economic growth. Fiscal expansions and fiscal consolida-
tions are identified by periods for which there is a significant change in the
cyclically-adjusted primary deficit as share of GDP. I find that on average,
expenditures-based fiscal expansion are more likely to increase the income of
the bottom 40 percent than revenues-based fiscal expansion. This result is
mainly driven by government current consumption, transfers and subsidies.
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In addition, these fiscal expansion measures help to reduce income inequality
by improving the income share of the bottom segments of the population
while reducing the top income share. However, fiscal expansion could either
have no effect on economic growth or prevent the latter through capital ex-
penditures increases. Results for fiscal consolidation are somewhat mixed.
Sometime, fiscal consolidation is associated with a decline of the income
growth of the less well-off and rising inequality, sometime the impact is non-
significant. None of the fiscal contraction measures affects significantly GDP
growth.
These findings have important policy implications. Countries with some fiscal
space could initiate or continue to implement safety nets program–like condi-
tional cash transfer programs–necessary to prevent the vulnerable segment of
the population to adverse shocks and to improve their living standards. With
a potential of stimulating low-skill employment, a wise fiscal stimulus through
government current consumption increases could also play a significant role
to reduce income inequality. Also, to avoid capital expenditures that hinder
economic growth, efficient public investment projects should be prioritized in
the policy making process. This consists of implementing investment projects
with higher productivity that can enhance economic growth necessary to re-
duce inequality.
Keywords : Fiscal policy, fiscal multipliers, sign restrictions, twin deficits,
accommodative monetary policy, local projection, income inequality, income
growth of the bottom 40 percent.
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2Chapter 1
Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks on
a Small Open Economy: Evidence
from Canada
31.1 Introduction
The aftermath of the 2008-09 Great Recession triggered renewed interest
on the impact of fiscal policy changes on the economy. In response to the
global recession, countries typically implemented a two-phase approach to
fiscal policy. First, the sudden economic collapse led fiscal authorities in
many advanced economies, including Canada, to introduce stimulus packages
to revive their economies. Following the stimulus, fiscal authorities shifted
gears, adopting adjustment plans to reduce public debt and ensure long-term
fiscal sustainability and sustained growth.
Stimulus measures in Canada, introduced through Canada’s Economic Ac-
tion Plan, were projected at 3.2 percent of GDP in the 2009 federal budget
while the ARRA was estimated at 7 percent of GDP. As a result, the federal
net debt-to-GDP ratio was expected to increase from 28.6 percent in the
2008-09 fiscal year to 32.1 percent by 2010-11. As the economy started to re-
cover, the Canadian government introduced adjustment plans to tackle high
deficits and increased public debt. The federal expenditures-to-GDP ratio,
which rose from about 13 percent before the crisis to 16 percent in 2009-10,
declined to 14 percent in 2011 and was projected in the 2012 budget to re-
turn to the pre-crisis level by 2014-15. The 2012 budget also projected that
adjustment measures would bring the federal net debt-to-GDP ratio back to
the pre-crisis level by 2014-15, while the consolidated net debt-to-GDP ratio
(including federal, provincial and local administrations) was projected to fall
to 36.3 percent of GDP (IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2013). 1 Therefore, exam-
ining the size of fiscal multiplier is important to informing the effectiveness
of such policy measures in reviving or not economic activity.
While extensive analysis has been conducted on the U.S. economy, only a
few studies (Perotti [2004], Corsetti and Müller [2006], Ravn et al. [2007]
and Monacelli and Perotti [2010]) have investigated the impact of fiscal pol-
icy changes in Canada. One challenge when studying the effects of fiscal
policy changes is to disentangle the automatic fiscal stabilizers to business
cycle fluctuations from changes attributed to discretionary policy decisions.
1. The total net debt, according to the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor, rose from 22.4 percent of
GDP in 2008 to 34.6 in 2012, and is projected to start falling in 2016 from 36.3 percent.
Meanwhile, the total gross debt rose from 71.3 percent of GDP in 2008 to 85.6 percent in
2012, and was projected to fall in 2014 to 84.6 percent of GDP, reaching 78.2 percent in
2018.
4This is even more important in a small open economy such as Canada, which
is subject to foreign shocks that affect key macroeconomic variables as well
as fiscal variables. To identify exogenous changes in fiscal policy, it is impor-
tant to control for the effects of foreign shocks. Canada is highly integrated
with the U.S. through trade and financial links. The U.S. accounts for about
75 percent of total Canadian exports, and American ownership of Canadian
assets was valued at more than 50 percent of Canadian GDP in 2009. 2 Any
demand shock affecting the U.S. may have a spillover effect on the Cana-
dian economy due to the importance of U.S.-Canada trade. The induced
changes in exports may affect corporate tax revenues and GDP. As a net
oil exporter, 3 Canada is susceptible to changes in the world oil price. The
Canadian economy produces about 4.1 percent of the world’s crude oil and
petroleum products. Any increase in oil prices may induce a rise in nominal
oil exports, and subsequently result in an increase in tax revenue through cor-
porate income taxes. Consequently, the observed change in Canadian fiscal
variables and their possible effects on the economy should not be attributed
solely to domestic fiscal policy changes.
The existing literature (e.g. Perotti [2004], Corsetti and Müller [2006], Ravn
et al. [2007], Monacelli and Perotti [2010] and Owyang et al. [2013]) does not
explicitly take into account spillovers from the U.S. economy and the effects
of oil prices. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature by examining the
impact of government spending and net tax revenue shocks on key Canadian
macroeconomic variables, conditional on U.S. economic developments and
fluctuations in the world oil price.
I use a VAR model with block exogeneity: a Canadian block including key
macroeconomic and fiscal variables, and a U.S. block including U.S. real
GDP to capture economic activity in the U.S. and the real oil price. I allow
the Canadian block to depend on the U.S. block, which is assumed to be
exogenous to the Canadian economy. As a small oil producer with a minor
contribution to the global economy, I assume that changes in the Canadian
economy do not affect international oil prices and U.S. GDP. However, I
allow for an interdependency between U.S. GDP and oil prices. Indeed, as
the main driver of the global activity, changes to U.S. oil demand may affect
2. According to Statistics Canada.
3. According to Energy Canada in 2013, Canada produces about 2.5 million barrels of
oil per day and consumes about 1.85 million barrels per day, and imports about 930,000
barrels per day and exports about 1.63 million barrels per day.
5international oil prices, and vice-versa. International oil prices may also be
affected by the supply of U.S. oil with the exploitation of shale oil.
My study examines the period from 1970:Q1 to 2010:Q4. 4 Structural shocks
are identified using the Mountford and Uhlig [2009] sign restrictions ap-
proach. I identify a generic business cycle shock and two fiscal shocks: a
government spending shock and a net tax revenue shock, each orthogonal to
the business cycle shock. 5
A number of exercises are performed to test the robustness of my findings. Af-
ter examining the impulse response functions (IRFs) for the identified shocks,
I assess GDP multipliers associated with net taxes and spending increases
with different specifications of the model: using only Canadian variables,
controlling only for the impact of U.S. GDP or oil prices, and controlling for
both. I split the sample at the fourth quarter of 1990 to test the stability
of the impact of fiscal policy shocks before and after the fourth quarter of
1990. 6 Then, I compare my results to the existing literature, and conclude by
comparing net tax multipliers and spending multipliers to draw some policy
conclusions.
The analysis of IRFs over the entire study period shows that output, con-
sumption and investment decline in response to an increase in net tax rev-
enue. Output and private consumption increase following a government
spending shock, while private investment falls. Net exports decline in re-
sponse to both spending and net tax increases (with a short delay for the
decline in response to a net increase in taxes) as a consequence of a real
exchange rate appreciation.
With respect to the estimated multipliers across different specifications, the
sign and statistical significance of estimated multipliers depend on whether
exogenous factors are controlled for. At the time of a shock, multipliers
associated with spending increases are positive and tend to have similar
magnitudes across various model specifications. One quarter after a shock,
multipliers associated with spending increases tend to be negative, but are
4. I choose this sample period because Canada employed a fixed exchange rate regime
before 1970 and a flexible exchange rate after 1970. Given that government spending
multiplier tend to vary according to the exchange rate regime(see Ilzetzki et al. [2013]), I
prefer to limit the study on the flexible exchange rate regime period.
5. The methodology section details how these shocks are identified.
6. The Bank of Canada introduced an inflation-targeting regime in the first quarter of
1991. This structural reform could have some implications for the size of fiscal multipliers.
6not statistically significant if both the U.S. GDP and world oil prices are
controlled for.
For the multipliers associated with net tax increases, the negative effects of
net taxes on GDP tend be larger when exogenous controls are included in
the VAR (except for the first quarter). 7
With respect to sub-period analysis, the impact of spending increases on
GDP and net exports 8 tends to be larger after the fourth quarter of 1990,
while the reverse holds true for investment and consumption. For the impact
of net taxes, the decline in GDP is more important in the first sub-period,
while the reverse holds true for private investment in the second sub-period;
the impact on consumption tends to be stable. The positive co-movement
of net exports with the real effective exchange rate (REER) in response to a
net tax shock in the first sub-period seems counterintuitive.
Quantitatively, I find that the multipliers associated with spending increases
are comparable with the findings of some existing Canadian studies, such
as the linear VAR estimates in Owyang et al. [2013]. My results are less
comparable with the multipliers estimated by Perotti [2004]. My findings of
increased private consumption and decreased private investment in response
to a government spending shock are consistent with the findings of Ravn
et al. [2007] and Perotti [2004]. The decline of net exports in response to
spending increases is in line with Corsetti and Müller [2006] and Monacelli
and Perotti [2010]. My findings with respect to the effects of both tax and
spending increases on GDP, consumption and investment are qualitatively
similar to some U.S. studies, including Blanchard and Perotti [2002] and
Mountford and Uhlig [2009]. However, the magnitude of the impact of fiscal
shocks in their studies tends to be larger as the U.S. is relatively a closed
7. Several explanations are possible for the behavior of fiscal multipliers across different
specifications. While it is not clear why the spending multipliers behave in this manner,
for net taxes, one possible explanation is the following. When there is no exogenous effect
on the VAR, a one-dollar increase in tax revenue might come from changes in tax policy
and oil prices, and/or from U.S. GDP fluctuations. Since changes in net tax revenue
coming from oil price variations and U.S. GDP variations are not a result of changes in
tax rates, they might not have consistent effects on GDP. Therefore, the portion of the
impact coming from changes in tax rates might be underestimated. Controlling for these
exogenous changes might therefore exacerbate the negative effects of an increase in net
tax revenue on GDP, as this increase results entirely from the change in tax policy.
8. While an increase in net exports following a government spending shock is somewhat
surprising, this results from a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate.
7economy.
A comparison of tax-cut and spending multipliers shows that tax-cut mul-
tipliers vary between 0.21 and 0.51. Meanwhile, spending multipliers range
between 0.21 and 1.09. Spending multipliers tend to be larger than tax-cut
multipliers, particularly after 1990. These results tend to suggest that fis-
cal adjustments through large spending cuts could be more harmful to the
economy than tax-based fiscal adjustments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 briefly reviews
other identification strategies, develops the empirical methodology and de-
scribes the data; section 1.3 reports and analyzes the results; and section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 Methodology and data
As outlined by Leeper et al. [2013], a difficulty when using a VAR model
to study fiscal policy is the model’s potential non-invertibility, as changes in
fiscal policy can be anticipated in advance. 9 One way to address this issue
is to incorporate forecasts of fiscal variables in the VAR, as has been done in
recent papers by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] and Born et al. [2012].
Unfortunately, these forecasts have only been available since 1985, and in a
semi-annual frequency, rather than quarterly. Therefore, I have assumed as
in existing studies (for example Mountford and Uhlig [2009], Ilzetzki et al.
[2013]) that my VAR model is invertible.
Before describing the methodology and the data used in the paper, here is
a brief review of some common alternative approaches to identifying fiscal
policy shocks.
9. Leeper et al. [2013] argue that conventional method can lead the econometrician to
label as ’tax shocks’ objects that are linear combinations of all the exogenous disturbances
at various leads and lags. [...] Fiscal foresight poses a formidable challenge because [...]
it generates an equilibrium with a non fundamental representation, [...] in which the
equilibrium time series contains a moving average component that is not invertible in
current and past observables.
81.2.1 Alternative approaches of identification of fiscal
policy shocks
The narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro [1998] and Romer and Romer
[2010] is a major innovation in identifying fiscal policy shocks. Ramey and
Shapiro [1998] identify an exogenous government spending shock using a
news variable that captures episodes that led to large military buildups in
the U.S.. 10 More recently, Owyang et al. [2013] use the same approach
to estimate spending multipliers contingent on the state of the economy in
Canada and in the U.S.. However, this approach is limited by the number
of observations of the news variable for countries such as Canada, which
rarely participate in large military operations. Romer and Romer [2010] use
narrative records, such as Congressional reports and presidential speeches,
to identify the main motivations for all major post-war tax policy changes
in the U.S.. Although this approach is more appropriate for identifying
exogenous changes in tax revenue, its implementation remains in practice
more cumbersome.
Another common technique is the recursive approach. It consists of imposing
the condition that government spending or tax revenue is not responsive
to business cycle shocks for at least one quarter (this approach is used by
Blanchard and Perotti [2002], Perotti [2004], Monacelli and Perotti [2010],
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012]). The logic behind this assumption is
that fiscal variables need more than one quarter to adjust in response to
unexpected changes in GDP. However, this assumption is often criticized.
1.2.2 The sign restrictions method
I extend the methodology employed by Mountford and Uhlig [2009] in the
case of a small open economy by assuming a block exogeneity in the VAR
model. Sign restrictions are imposed on the IRFs of a set of variables to
identify structural shocks. The advantage of this approach is that it does
not assume a lack of contemporaneous effects of unexpected changes in GDP
on fiscal variables. This strategy is also used to identify exogenous technology
shocks (see, for example, Dedola and Neri [2007], Enders et al. [2011]) and
10. These episodes correspond to the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Carter-Reagan
fiscal expansion and, more recently, the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
(see Ramey [2011]).
9monetary policy shocks (see Uhlig [2005], Mallick and Rafiq [2008]).
1.2.2.1 The sign restrictions assumptions
Table 1.1 summarizes the minimal assumptions imposed to identify structural
shocks. Following Mountford and Uhlig [2009], a generic business cycle shock
is defined as a shock that increases Canadian GDP, private consumption,
private investment and net tax revenues for four quarters following the shock.
Table 1.1 – Identifying sign restrictions assumptions
Generic business- Government Net tax revenue
cycle shock spending shock shock
Government spending +
Net tax revenue + +
Private consumption +
Private investment +
GDP +
Net-exports-to-GDP ratio
GDP deflator
3-month T-bill rate
REER
U.S. GDP 0 0 0
Oil prices 0 0 0
Notes: The sign "+" means that the variable responds positively for 4 quarters following the shock;
the "0" means that the impulse responses of the variable are restricted to zero in perpetuity after the
shock.
Once the business cycle is identified, each fiscal policy shock is identified
as following: a net tax revenue shock is a shock that increases only the net
tax revenue for four quarters following the shock and is orthogonal to the
business cycle shock, while a government spending shock is a shock that only
increases government spending for four quarters following the shock and is
orthogonal to the business cycle shock. Since I assume that Canada is a small
open economy, U.S. GDP and oil prices do not respond to the shocks that hit
the Canadian economy. The signs of the main macroeconomic variables are
agnostic to the fiscal policy shocks. Note that, I choose 4 quarters because a
fiscal year corresponds to 4 quarters.
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1.2.2.2 The VAR model and the identification procedure
The VAR model is specified as:
A(L)yt = t (1.1)
where yt is a m× 1 vector of observations, A(L) is an m×m lag polynomial
matrix, and L is the lag operator with the non-negative powers. t is an
m× 1 vector of structural shocks with:
yt =
[
y1t
y2t
]
; A(L) =
[
A11(L) A12(L)
0 A22(L)
]
t =
[
1t
2t
]
and E[′] = Im
y1t is an m1 × 1 vector of Canadian economic variables, and y2t is a m2 × 1
vector including U.S. GDP and oil prices, where m1 + m2 = m; 1t and 2t
are, respectively, m1 × 1 and m2 × 1 vectors of structural disturbances. The
dimensions of A11(L), A12(L) and A22(L) are m1×m1, m1×m2 and m2×m2
respectively.
The restriction A21(L) = 0 follows from the assumption that the Canadian
block variable y1t does not enter into the second block y2t either contempora-
neously, or with lagged values in the structural form (1.1). The reduced-form
version of the structural model (1.1) can be written as follows:
yt =
P∑
i=1
Biyt−i + ut (1.2)
where Bi =
[
Bi11 B
i
12
0 Bi22
]
; ut =
[
u1t
u2t
]
; with E[uu′] = Ω =
[
Ω11 Ω12
Ω12
′ Ω22
]
Because the right-hand-side variables of the previous reduced form differ
across equations due to the block exogeneity, the estimation of each equation
using ordinary least squares (OLS) is inefficient. For this reason, I follow the
methodology developed by Hamilton [1994], 11 transforming the model such
that OLS remains efficient. The reduced form model is then transformed as
follows:
y1t =
P∑
i=1
Bi11y1t−i +
P∑
i=0
Giy2t−i + vt (1.3)
11. Pages 309-312.
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with
E[vv′] = H
y2t =
P∑
i=1
Bi22y2t−i + u2t (1.4)
with
E[u2u2
′] = Ω22
The previous equations are then estimated equation by equation using OLS.
Thereafter, the coefficients of original reduced form (1.2) are recovered using
the following relationships:
Ωˆ12 = Gˆ0Ωˆ22, Bˆi12 = Gˆi + Gˆ0Bˆ
i
22, i = 1, .., P and Ωˆ11 = Hˆ + Gˆ0Ωˆ
′
22
To identify structural shocks t, it is necessary to find a matrix A such that
ut = At and Ω = AA
′
, with
A =
[
A11 A12
0 A22
]
Let n be the number of structural shocks to be identified. Mountford and
Uhlig [2009] show that identification of these shocks is equivalent to identi-
fying an impulse matrix of size m × n, that is a sub matrix [a(1), ..., a(n)] of
the matrix A such that
[a(1), ..., a(n)] = A˜Q (1.5)
for any m×m matrix A˜′ satisfying the following relationship
Ω = AA′ = A˜A˜
′
(1.6)
where Q = [q(1), ..., q(n)] is a m × n orthonormal matrix, that is QQ′ = Im.
The previous authors identify A˜ as the Cholesky factor of Ω. However, with
the block exogeneity, the procedure is different. Appendix 1 shows in details
how A˜ is identified.
Once A˜ is identified, Mountford and Uhlig [2009] show that the IRF to a
structural shock s = 1, ..., n (i.e. the IRF to the impulse vector a = a(s))
is given as the linear combination of the impulse responses obtained under
the A˜ decomposition of Ω. Consider rji(k) as the impulse response of the jth
12
variable at horizon k to the ith shock (that is, the ith column of A˜) under the
A˜ decomposition of Ω and the m× 1 dimensional column vector ri(k) as the
vector response [r1i(k), ..., rmi(k)]’, the m × 1-dimensional impulse response
ra(k)
12 at horizon k to the impulse vector a is given by:
ra(k) =
m∑
i=1
qiri(k) (1.7)
where qi is the ith entry of q. Identification of the structural shock s, that
is the impulse vector a = a(s) with sign restriction consists of selecting the
right impulse vector a = a(s) that satisfies sign restrictions imposed on the
IRFs. The procedure is explained in detail in Appendix 1.
1.2.3 Data description
The VAR-system is composed of two blocks y1t and y2t of quarterly data
from the first quarter of 1970 to fourth quarter of 2010. The first block y1t
contains Canadian variables: (a) GDP, (b) private consumption, (c) private
non-residential investment, (d) government spending, (e) net tax revenue, (f)
GDP deflator, (g) REER, (h) net-exports-to-GDP ratio and (i) the 3-month
T-bill rate. Variables (a) to (e) are presented in real per-capita terms by
dividing each real variable by the labour force.
Except for the net-exports-to-GDP ratio and the 3-month T-bill rate, all the
variables are expressed in log form. Private consumption is comprised of
non-durable goods and services. Government spending is government pur-
chases (i.e. the sum of current consumption and public investment). Net
tax revenue is the sum of personal and corporate income tax revenues, social
security contributions and taxes on production and imports, net of transfers
to households and private corporations. Real net tax revenue is obtained
by dividing the nominal tax revenue by the GDP deflator (2002 = 100).
The definition of these variables is in line with previous studies, in order to
facilitate consistent comparisons.
Except for the REER, all the variables in the Canadian block are from Statis-
tics Canada’s CANSIM database. The REER, based on relative unit labour
costs in the manufacturing sector, is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
12. The jth element rja(k) of ra(k), j = 1, ..,m is the impulse response at horizon k of
the jth variable to the impulse vector a.
13
Louis (FRED) database. A rise in the index as shown in Figure A1 (the
net-exports-to-GDP ratio declines with an increase of the REER) in Ap-
pendix represents a deterioration in the country’s competitiveness. The sec-
ond block, y2t, includes the logarithm of U.S. real GDP (2005=100) per capita
and real oil prices. U.S. GDP is from the U.S. National Income and Prod-
uct Accounts database. Oil prices are expressed in real terms by dividing
the West Texas Intermediate Oil Price (in U.S. current dollars per barrel)
taken from the IMF-WEO database by the U.S. GDP deflator(2005 = 100). I
choose the GDP deflator instead of the consumer price index in order to have
the same base year as U.S. GDP. Following Ilzetzki et al. [2013], data used
are deviations of non-stationary variables from their linear trend. Results
remain unchanged using a quadratic trend. 13
1.3 Results
I estimate a VAR with 2 lags, where the number of lags is chosen using the
Bayesian information criterion. I test the exogeneity of y2t with a likelihood
ratio test. The results of the test, not shown here, do not reject the null
hypothesis of a block exogeneity at the 5-percent level. The following sub-
section analyzes the IRFs to the identified shocks, assesses GDP multipliers
associated with spending and tax increases without and including exogenous
variables y2t in the model, studies the impact of fiscal policy shocks over two
sub-periods (before and after 1990:Q4), compares the results to existing es-
timates, and finally compares spending and tax multipliers in order to draw
some policy conclusions.
1.3.1 IRFs to identified shocks
The IRFs to the identified shocks are displayed in the subsequent figures.
The shaded areas around the median IRF are the 68 percent confidence
regions constructed from 5,000 draws of parameters from the Normal-Wishart
distribution. For each draw, the IRFs are computed at each horizon and the
16th, 50th and 84th quantiles are chosen to construct the confidence intervals.
The green bands represent the imposed sign restrictions.
13. Although keeping variables in level in the VAR-system would implicitly accounts for
any existing cointegration relationship, variables are detrended because the VAR-system
is not stationary with variables in level.
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1.3.1.1 Effects of a business cycle shock
Defined as a shock for which Canadian GDP, private consumption, private
investment and net tax revenue increase for four quarters following the shock,
the IRFs to this shock are shown in Figure 1.1. The IRFs of these variables
remain positive many quarters after the shock. In particular, the response
of consumption tends to be highly persistent and behaves in a hump-shaped
fashion. This behavior of consumption can be interpreted as a consequence
of a higher degree of habit formation. The buoyant response of net tax rev-
enue (net tax revenue increases at higher rate than GDP) can be interpreted
as a result of progressive marginal income tax rates. Because government
spending here does not incorporate transfers, the response of government
purchases is not countercyclical. Instead, as the resources in the economy
increase, public investment and current consumption increase too. The de-
cline of the price level is less intuitive, since all components of aggregate
demand increase. However, this response could be a result of a countercycli-
clal response of monetary policy (the interest rate increases in response to
the shock) to dampen the effect of aggregate demand on the price level. The
response of the net-exports-to-GDP ratio behaves in the opposite direction
of the REER. As the REER increases upon impact, net exports decline and
increase when the REER starts to fall.
1.3.1.2 Effects of a government spending shock
The IRFs to the government spending shock are displayed in Figure 1.2. The
response of government purchases is positive for four quarters following the
shock as imposed by the identifying assumptions. The effect of the shock
on GDP is weak upon impact and remains insignificant for many quarters.
The response of net tax revenue follows the same pattern as the response
of GDP, despite the slight decline upon impact. Private consumption is
crowded-in by government spending. While this result is at odds with the
standard real business cycle prediction, it is consistent with recent empirical
findings regarding the effect of government shock on private consumption. By
contrast, private investment is crowded out, as predicted by the standard real
business cycle model. The slight increase in the response of the 3-month T-
bill rate could explain this result. The government spending shock decreases
the competitiveness of the country as the REER appreciates in the aftermath
of the shock, subsequently causing a deterioration of the trade balance. This
15
Figure 1.1 – IRFs to a business cycle shock
Notes: The green areas denote the identified sign restriction assumptions, the blue lines denote the
median impulse responses, and the shaded areas denote the 68% confidence region.
result in the literature is known as “twin deficits,” that is the coexistence of
a trade deficit and budget deficit.
1.3.1.3 Effects of a net tax revenue shock
The IRFs to a net tax revenue shock are displayed in Figure 1.3. By construc-
tion, the response of net tax revenue is positive for four quarters following
the shock. A net tax revenue shock has a negative impact on private activi-
ties, as private consumption and private investment fall upon impact. This
decline persists for many quarters after the shock. As a result, GDP also
16
Figure 1.2 – IRFs to a government spending shock
Notes: The green areas denote the identified sign restriction assumptions, the blue lines denote the
median impulse responses, and the shaded areas denote the 68% confidence region.
declines. Because the impact of a shock on net tax revenue is not persistent,
the three variables start to increase as net tax revenue decreases, although
the impact remains negative. Government purchases behave procyclically,
following the same pattern as the response of GDP. Monetary policy tends
to behave countercyclically, where monetary authorities reduce the nominal
interest rate to dampen the negative effect of the increase in taxes on the
private sector.
The co-movement of net exports to GDP with REER in the short run in
response to the shock seems less intuitive. While one might expect compet-
17
itiveness to be reduced due to an appreciation of the REER as the rise in
taxes increases the country’s production costs in the manufacturing sector,
the increase of net exports in the first quarters after the shock is unexpected.
However, in the long run, net exports fall as the competitiveness of the coun-
try declines. The rise of the price level in the short run might be a result of
the effect on aggregate supply dominating the effect on aggregate demand. 14
Figure 1.3 – IRFs to a net tax revenue shock
Notes: The green areas denote the identified sign restriction assumptions, the blue lines denote the
median impulse responses, and the shaded areas denote the 68% confidence region.
14. The shift of the supply curve to the left as production costs rise with the increase in
taxes is larger than the shift of the demand curve to the left.
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1.3.2 Measuring GDPmultipliers for fiscal policy shocks
GDP multipliers measure the impact on GDP in dollars induced by a varia-
tion of one dollar in particular fiscal variables. I report two measures of GDP
multiplier: the impact multiplier and the cumulative multiplier. For each fis-
cal indicator, I also report the maximum response of GDP multiplier. The
impact multiplier, M0Y,F (k) measures the change in dollars in GDP at period
k induced by a one-dollar change to a fiscal variable in the first period. This
is the multiplier typically used in the literature, such as in Blanchard and
Perotti [2002]. The cumulative multiplier, CMY,F (k) allows for the analysis
of the persistence of a shock, since, as noted by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
[2012], the size of the multiplier tends to depend on the persistence of the
shock. It measures the impact in dollars of each shock along the entire path
of the responses up to a given period k. The indicators are defined as follows:
M0Y,F (k) =
rY,F (k)
rF,F (0)
1
F/Y
(1.8)
CMY,F (k) =
∑k
h=0 rY,F (h)∑k
h=0 rF,F (h)
1
F/Y
(1.9)
where rj,F (k) denotes the IRF of variable j to the fiscal shock F at period
k. Because government purchases and net tax revenue are expressed in logs,
the IRFs are scaled by the inverse of the sample average ratio of the fiscal
variable over GDP, F/Y . For each of the fiscal policy shocks, I calculate the
multipliers (i) using only Canadian variables, (ii) including only oil prices or
the U.S. GDP, and (iii) treating both as exogenous variables.
1.3.2.1 GDP multipliers associated with spending increases
Table 1.2 reports the estimated multipliers associated with a one-dollar in-
crease in government purchases within the first quarter. When using only
Canadian variables, the multiplier within the first quarter is equal to $0.26.
After one year, both multiplier measures become negative. Qualitatively,
these results are consistent with findings of Mountford and Uhlig [2009].
When I control only for oil prices, the size of the multipliers diminishes
slightly upon impact, but for the rest of the period, the patterns are very
similar with the first panel where I include only Canadian variables in the
VAR. Controlling only for U.S. GDP or both exogenous variables changes the
19
patterns of the multipliers. Within the first quarter, the multiplier is equal to
$0.21, slightly less than in the previous case. After one year, the multipliers
remain statistically insignificant, but they are not negative anymore. Overall,
within the first quarter, the multiplier associated with spending increases is
slightly larger when there is no exogenous control in the VAR model.
1.3.2.2 GDP multipliers associated with a net tax increase
Table 1.3 reports the estimated multipliers associated with a one-dollar in-
crease in net tax revenue within the first quarter. Using only Canadian
variables in the VAR, a one-dollar increase in net tax revenue leads to a de-
cline in GDP of about $0.35 upon impact. As net tax revenue declines, the
multipliers gradually become positive.
Controlling for oil prices, GDP decreases by $0.17 upon impact and reaches
the minimum of $0.26 dollars in the 2nd quarter for the impact multiplier, and
$0.58 dollars for the cumulative multiplier in the 12th quarter. The patterns
are very similar when controlling only for U.S. GDP or for both oil prices
and U.S. GDP. Upon impact, GDP declines by about $0.32.
Overall, except the first quarter, the negative effects of net taxes on GDP
tend be larger when exogenous controls are included in the VAR. These
results are in line with the expectations. Indeed, when there is no exogenous
control variable in the VAR, a one-dollar increase in tax revenue might come
from changes in tax policy, oil prices, and/or U.S. GDP. Because changes in
tax revenue coming from oil price and U.S. GDP fluctuations do not result
from domestic changes to tax rates, they might not have significant effects
on GDP. Therefore, the part of the impact coming from changes to tax rates
might not be large enough. Controlling for these exogenous changes might
therefore increase the negative effects of an increase in net tax revenue on
GDP, as this increase results entirely from changes in tax policy.
1.3.3 Sub-period analysis
Sub-period analysis is an exercise that allows me to test the stability of the
impact of a fiscal policy shock over time. I therefore split the sample at the
4th quarter of 1990 in order to have two sub-periods with relatively the same
size. This partition also corresponds to a change in monetary policy regime
in Canada, as the Central Bank introduced an inflation targeting regime
20
Table 1.2 – GDP multiplier associated with spending increases
Quarters 1 4 8 12 20 Peak
Canadian variables only
Impact multiplier 0.26* -0.50* -1.02* -1.19* -1.03* 0.26*(1)
Govt. spending 1.00* 0.94* 0.79* 0.66* 0.44*
Net tax revenue 0.02 -0.93* -1.39* -1.47* -1.22*
Cumulative multiplier 0.26* -0.14* -0.55* -0.85* -1.22* 0.26*(1)
Controlling only for oil prices
Impact multiplier 0.23* -0.50* -0.90* -0.99* -0.77* 0.23*(1)
Govt. spending 1.00* 0.94* 0.77* 0.61* 0.40*
Net tax revenue 0.23* -0.81* -1.16* -1.14* -0.89*
Cumulative multiplier 0.23* -0.17* -0.52* -0.77* -1.08* 0.23*(1)
Controlling only for U.S. GDP
Impact multiplier 0.21* -0.08 -0.19 -0.14 0.05 0.23*(30)
Govt. spending 1.00* 0.85* 0.65* 0.48* 0.26*
Net tax revenue 0.01 -0.46* -0.51* -0.36* -0.06
Cumulative multiplier 0.21* 0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 0.21*(1)
Controlling for U.S. GDP and oil prices
Impact multiplier 0.21* 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 0.07 0.21*(1)
Govt. spending 1.00* 0.85* 0.64* 0.48* 0.25*
Net tax revenue -0.07* -0.63* -0.66* -0.48* -0.17*
Cumulative multiplier 0.21* 0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.21*(1)
Notes: Each panel of this table provide the multipliers associated with a one-dollar increase in government
spending in the first quarter. The first and fourth rows represent the impact multiplier and the cumulative
multiplier, respectively, for each quarter. The multipliers given here are the medians and * denotes that 0
does not belong to the confidence region. The second and third rows represent the response of government
spending and net tax revenue. The last column reports the maximum multipliers, and numbers in brackets
denote the quarters in which these maximums are observed.
in 1991:Q1 to stabilize inflation. In the following, I study the impact of the
government spending and net tax revenue shocks over both sub-periods while
controlling for changes in the state of the U.S. economy and world oil price.
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Table 1.3 – GDP multipliers associated with net tax increases
Quarters 1 4 8 12 20 Peak
Canadian variables only
Impact multiplier -0.35* -0.10* 0.16* 0.36* 0.59* -0.35*(1)
Govt. spending -0.10* -0.07* -0.07 -0.06 -0.05
Net tax revenue 1.00* 0.82* 0.65* 0.55* 0.46*
Cumulative multiplier -0.35* -0.25* -0.09* 0.06* 0.36* -0.35*(1)
Controlling only for oil prices
Impact multiplier -0.17* -0.26* -0.15* -0.02 0.14 -0.26*(4)
Govt. spending -0.12* -0.04* 0.00 0.01 0.02
Net tax revenue 1.00* 0.36* 0.09 0.04 0.06
Cumulative multiplier -0.17* -0.35* -0.53* -0.58* -0.30* -0.58*(12)
Controlling only for U.S. GDP
Impact multiplier -0.31* -0.28* -0.21* -0.09* 0.13* -0.31*(1)
Govt. spending -0.06* -0.02* 0.01 0.02 0.03
Net tax revenue 1.00* 0.63* 0.32* 0.15* 0.07
Cumulative multiplier -0.31* -0.36* -0.44* -0.47* -0.35* -0.47*(13)
Controlling for U.S. GDP and oil prices
Impact multiplier -0.32* -0.15* -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.32*(1)
Govt. spending -0.10* -0.05* -0.01 0.02 0.03
Net tax revenue 1.00* 0.46* 0.16* 0.05 0.01
Cumulative multiplier -0.32* -0.33* -0.34* -0.33* -0.24* -0.34*(9)
Notes: Each panel of this table provide the multipliers associated with a one-dollar increase in net tax
revenue in the first quarter. The first and fourth rows represent the impact multiplier and the cumulative
multiplier, respectively at each quarter. The multipliers given here are the median and * denotes that
0 does not belong to the confidence region. The second and third quarters represent the response of
government spending and net tax revenue. The last column reports the maximum multipliers (in absolute
value) and numbers in brackets denote the quarters in which these maximums are observed.
1.3.3.1 Sub-period analysis of the effects of a government spend-
ing shock
Table 1.4 reports the multipliers associated with a one-dollar increase in
government purchases within the first quarter over both sub-periods. The
results suggest that the impact of a government spending shock on GDP tends
to be larger in the second sub-period than in the first sub-period. Within the
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first quarter, GDP increases by $0.4 in the first sub-period, while it increases
by $0.70 in the second. The maximum effect for the impact multiplier is
achieved upon impact for the first sub-period, while it is achieved with a
short delay of two quarters in the second sub-period and equal to $0.92.
For the cumulative multiplier, the maximum effect is equal to $0.66 in the
first sub-period, while it is equal to $1.09 in the second. However, both
effects are achieved after a long delay. Several quarters after the shock, tax
revenue falls faster in the second sub-period than in the first sub-period. The
persistent response of government spending coupled with this large drop in
tax revenue may contribute to the larger impact of a government spending
shock on output in the second sub-period.
The effects of spending increases on GDP components over both sub-periods
are reported in the first two panels of Table 1.6. Consumption is crowded-
in by a government spending shock during the first sub-period, while the
reverse holds true in the second sub-period. Private investment declines over
the two sub-periods, but the drop is larger in the second sub-period, as the
three-month T-bill rate increases slightly. The responses of the net-exports-
to-GDP ratio is somewhat surprising over both sub-periods. While a decrease
in net exports in response to a government spending shock is expected, during
the first sub-period, this decrease in net exports does not come from a real
exchange rate appreciation as expected. Instead, in response to the shock,
both variables co-move as shown in Figure A2 in Appendix. During the
second sub-period, net exports decline within the first quarter as the real
exchange rate increases. One quarter after the shock, the depreciation of
the real exchange rate for the rest of the period as shown in Figure A3 in
Appendix leads to a net increase in net exports. Overall, the impact of
the spending shock on private consumption and private investment tends to
decline over time.
1.3.3.2 Sub-period analysis of the effect of the net tax revenue
shock
The impact of a net tax revenue shock on GDP over the two sub-periods is
reported in Table 1.5. In response to an increase in net tax revenue of $1,
GDP declines by $0.38 upon impact during the first sub-period and by $0.21
during the second sub-period. The peak response in the second sub-period is
equal to -$0.51, while in the first sub-period, it is equal to the response upon
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Table 1.4 – Multipliers associated with spending increases over both sub-periods
Quarters 1 4 8 12 20 Peak
1970:Q1-1990:Q4
Impact multiplier 0.44* -0.07 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.44*(1)
Govt. spending 1.00* 0.40* 0.24* 0.18 0.13
Net tax revenue -0.64* -1.18* -0.50* -0.08 0.07
Cumulative multiplier 0.44* 0.10 0.12 0.23* 0.52 0.66(30)
1991:Q1-2010:Q4
Impact multiplier 0.70* 0.85* 0.80* 0.79* 0.40* 0.92*(2)
Govt. spending 1.00* 1.08* 0.89* 0.59* 0.26
Net tax revenue 0.01 -1.08* -1.33* -1.02* -0.46
Cumulative multiplier 0.70* 0.80* 0.82* 0.91* 1.08* 1.09*(24)
Notes: This table reports GDP multipliers and responses of government spending and net tax revenue to
a government spending shock over the two sub-periods. The multipliers are the median, and * denotes
that 0 does not belong to the confidence region. The last column reports the maximum multipliers and
numbers in brackets denote the quarters in which these maximums are observed.
impact.
For the cumulative multiplier, the same patterns are observed. The decline
in GDP is larger in the first sub-period than in the second sub-period. The
response of net tax revenue may explain this different impact on GDP. After
the shock, net tax revenue declines steadily in the second sub-period, while
the decline in the first sub-period tends to be faster.
The two last panels in Table 1.6 report the effects of a positive net tax revenue
shock over both sub-periods on GDP components. These results suggest that,
in response to a shock, private consumption and private investment decline
over the two sub-periods, with a larger effect after 1990. For instance, within
the first quarter, consumption and investment decline respectively by 0.10
and 0.90 percent during the inflation-targeting period, while they decline only
by 0.07 and 0.42 percent before the new regime. The response of net exports
is somewhat surprising during the first sub-period. Net exports increase
slightly while the real exchange rate appreciates, as shown in Figure A4 in
Appendix. During the second sub-period, net exports react as expected.
As shown in Figure A5 in Appendix, the later decline is a result of a real
exchange rate appreciation.
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Table 1.5 – Multipliers associated with a net tax revenue shock over both sub-
periods
Quarters 1 4 8 12 20 Peak
1970:Q1-1990:Q4
Impact multiplier -0.38* -0.23* -0.14 -0.07 0.01 -0.38*(1)
Govt. spending -0.19 * -0.08* -0.02 0.00 0.01
Net tax revenue 1.00* 0.53* 0.16* 0.03 0.03
Cumulative multiplier -0.38* -0.40* -0.45* -0.51* -0.36 -0.51*(13)
1991:Q1-2010:Q4
Impact multiplier -0.21* -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 -0.21*(1)
Govt. spending -0.20* -0.18* -0.10 -0.02 0.04
Net tax revenue 1.00* 0.36* 0.18* 0.06 -0.04
Cumulative multiplier -0.21* -0.10 -0.17 -0.28* -0.43* -0.44*(22)
Notes: This table reports GDP multipliers and responses of government spending and net tax revenues
to a government spending shock over the two sub-periods. The multipliers are the median, and * denotes
that 0 does not belong to the confidence region. The last column reports the maximum multipliers (in
absolute value) and numbers in brackets denote the quarters in which these maximums are observed.
1.3.4 Comparison of the results with existing estimates
Differences in my results compared with existing studies of the impact of
fiscal policy in Canada may be explained by different time periods being
considered and different methodologies (this study relies on sign restrictions
and, importantly, controls for spillovers from the U.S. economy and for oil
price fluctuations). To my knowledge, except for Perotti [2004] and Owyang
et al. [2013], most other papers examining empirical evidence of the impact
of fiscal policy shocks in Canada do not explicitly report numerical results.
Rather, they report the IRFs on graphs, making any quantitative compari-
son difficult. Therefore, the quantitative comparison is limited to these two
papers, as they use the same fiscal variables.
1.3.4.1 Comparison with Owyang et al. [2013]
The cumulative multipliers associated with spending increases are compared
to those of Owyang et al. [2013] for Canada in Table 1.7. They estimate GDP
multipliers associated with government spending, contingent on the state
of the economy (characterized by the unemployment rate). They identify
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Table 1.6 – Effects of fiscal policy shocks on GDP components over both sub-
periods
Quarters 1 4 8 12 20 Peak
Spending: 1970:Q1-1990:Q4
Consumption 0.19* 0.21* 0.15* 0.11 0.08 0.21*(3)
Investment -0.10 -0.49 -0.14 0.14 0.11 -0.49(4)
Net exports/GDP -0.11* -0.22* -0.23* -0.24* -0.18* -0.24*(11)
Spending: 1991:Q1-2010:Q4
Consumption 0.07* -0.01* -0.17* -0.22* -0.17* 0.08*(2)
Investment 0.04 -2.56* -2.76* -2.15* -1.17* -2.87*(6)
Net exports/GDP -0.06 0.18* 0.21* 0.21* 0.16* -0.06(1)
Net taxes: 1970:Q1-1990:Q4
Consumption -0.07* -0.05* -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.07*(1)
Investment -0.42* -0.08 -0.14 -0.10 0.02 -0.42*(1)
Net exports/GDP 0.03* 0.06* 0.05* 0.03 0.00 -0.01(25)
Net taxes: 1991:Q1-2010:Q4
Consumption -0.10* -0.04* -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.10*(1)
Investment -0.90* -0.07 0.10 0.06 -0.06 -0.90*(1)
Net exports/GDP 0.00 -0.06* -0.09* -0.10* -0.09* -0.10*(14)
Notes: This table reports the responses of GDP components to fiscal policy shocks over the two sub-
periods.The first two panels are responses to the government spending shock, while the last two panels
report responses to the net tax revenue shock.The responses are the medians, and * denotes that 0 does
not belong to the confidence region. The last column reports the peak effects, and numbers in brackets
denote the quarters in which these peak effects occur.
a government spending shock as a news shock using expected change in
military spending. The comparison with their linear VAR specification shows
that over the first sub-period, the multipliers in this study are below their
multipliers, but over the second-period, they are slightly above. It should be
noted that in both studies, the multipliers are increasing with the number of
periods following the initial increase in spending.
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Table 1.7 – Comparison with Owyang et al. [2013]
2-year integral 4-year integral Peak
My results
Sub-sample 1 0.12 0.38 0.44
Sub-sample 2 0.82 1.01 0.85
Owyang et al. [2013]
Linear VAR 0.67 0.79 0.57
High unemploment 1.60 1.16 0.65
Low unemployment 0.44 0.46 0.49
Notes: This table compares the multipliers associated with spending increases to Owyang et al.
[2013]’s multipliers. The integral measures are computed as the cumulative multipliers. The
peak measure is the ratio of the IRF of GDP and government purchases at their respective peaks
scaled by the inverse of the average ratio of G/Y.
1.3.4.2 Comparison with Perotti [2004]
Perotti [2004] examines the impact of spending increases and tax cuts on
OECD countries, including Canada. For the Canadian economy, Perotti uses
two sub-periods, S1 and S2, corresponding to 1961:Q1-1980:Q4 and 1981Q1-
2001:Q4, respectively. Perotti reports the cumulative multipliers after four
quarters and 12 quarters. Although it would be more interesting to consider
the same sub-periods, the lack of data for some variables, such as the real
effective exchange rate before 1970, makes the exercise difficult. However,
the sub-periods in both studies are similar in size and occur during roughly
the same time period.
Table 1.8 compares the cumulative multipliers defined above with Perotti’s
measure of cumulative multipliers. There are some differences in our results.
For spending increases, Perotti finds larger GDP multipliers in the first sub-
period than in the second sub-period, while the reverse holds true in this
study. The same pattern is observed for the multipliers associated with tax
cuts. Perotti finds higher multipliers during the second sub-period, while the
reverse holds true in this study. However, both studies do find that tax cuts
do not necessarily result in higher GDP multipliers.
With respect to the responses of investment and consumption to a govern-
ment spending shock, the two studies are similar. In both studies, consump-
tion rises significantly during the first sub-period and declines in the second
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sub-period. Private investment falls in both sub-periods, as well as over the
whole sample.
Table 1.8 – Comparison with Perotti [2004]
Spending Net taxes
Quarters 4 12 4 12
My results
1970:Q1-1990:Q4 0.10 0.23 0.40 0.51
1991:Q1-2010:Q4 0.80 0.91 0.10 0.28
Perotti [2004]
1960:Q1-1980:Q4 0.98 0.58 -0.04 -0.22
1981:Q1-2001:Q4 -0.32 -1.10 0.42 1.51
Notes: This table compares the multipliers of this study to Perotti [2004]’s multipliers. My
measure of the multiplier here is the cumulative multiplier. Since the effects are symmetric,
the multipliers associated with a net tax revenue increase are scaled by -1 to express them
as responses to tax cuts.
1.3.4.3 Comparison with other studies
With respect to studies of the impact of fiscal policy in Canada, the rise of
private consumption in response to a government spending shock is consis-
tent with the findings of Ravn et al. [2007]. With respect to the effect of
a government spending shock on net exports, while I do find an increase in
net exports following the implementation of the inflation-targeting regime,
my results are consistent with the twin deficits suggested by the results of
Corsetti and Müller [2006] and Monacelli and Perotti [2010], when consider-
ing the first sub-period and the whole sample.
With respect to U.S. studies, my findings on the effects of both tax and
spending increases on consumption and investment are similar to the results
of Blanchard and Perotti [2002] and Mountford and Uhlig [2009]. In the whole
sample and during the first sub-period, consumption rises sharply in response
to a government spending shock, consistent with Blanchard and Perotti.
During the second sub-period, consumption rises upon impact, but declines
some periods after the shock; this is consistent with Mountford and Uhlig. I
find, as do Blanchard and Perotti and Mountford and Uhlig, that investment
declines in response to both tax and spending increases; consumption also
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declines in response to tax increases. However, the size of the impact in this
study is less than in Blanchard and Perotti and Mountford and Uhlig.
1.3.5 Policy implications: Spending vs. tax cuts
Table 1.9 reports the cumulative multipliers associated with spending in-
creases and tax cuts over the whole sample and over each sub-period. The
results suggest that (i) regardless of the period, the multipliers associated
with net taxes vary between $0.21 and $0.51, while those associated with
spending range between $0.21 and $1.09; (ii) taxes tend to have larger mul-
tipliers over the whole sample and during the first sub-period than during
the second sub-period, but the difference with the multipliers associated with
spending is not large enough (in absolute value); and (iii) over the second
sub-period, GDP multipliers associated with spending tend to be larger than
those associated with net tax revenue increases.
Table 1.9 – Cumulative multipliers associated with spending increases and net
tax cuts
Quarters after shock 1 4 8 12 20 Peak
Whole sample
Spending 0.21* 0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.21*(1)
Net taxes 0.32* 0.33* 0.34* 0.33* 0.24* 0.34*(9)
Sub-period1
Spending 0.44* 0.10 0.12 0.23* 0.52 0.66(30)
Net taxes 0.38* 0.40* 0.45* 0.51* 0.36 0.51*(13)
Sub-period2
Spending 0.70* 0.80* 0.82* 0.91* 1.08* 1.09*(24)
Net taxes 0.21* 0.10 0.17 0.28* 0.43* 0.44*(22)
Notes: This table compares the cumulative multipliers associated with spending and tax increases. Since
the effects are symmetric, the multipliers associated with net tax increases have been multiplied by -1 to
be interpreted as responses to tax cuts.
These results suggest that given the size of the multipliers associated with
spending increases over the last two decades, a large fiscal adjustment through
spending cuts could be very harmful to the economy than tax-based fiscal
adjustments.
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1.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I use quarterly data from 1970 to 2010 to study the impact of
government spending and net tax revenue shocks on key Canadian macroe-
conomic variables, employing sign restrictions as an identification strategy.
I explicitly control for spillovers from the U.S. economy and for world oil
price fluctuations. In addition, I examine the impact of fiscal shocks over
two sub-periods: before and after the fourth quarter of 1990.
This paper has several key findings. The estimated value of both spending
and tax multipliers is sensitive to the inclusion of relative oil price and U.S.
GDP in the VAR model. Output, consumption and investment decline as
a response to an increase in net taxes. Output and private consumption
increase when government purchases increase, whereas private investment
falls. Net exports decline in response to both spending and net tax increases
(with a short delay for the decline in response to the net tax increase) as a
result of real exchange rate appreciation. Tax-cut multipliers vary between
$0.20 and $0.50, while spending multipliers range between $0.20 and $1.10.
Spending multipliers tend to be particularly larger than tax-cut multipliers
over the last two decades.
The composition of government spending is relevant for the size of the mul-
tipliers. For example, some theoretical and empirical findings suggest that
government investment tend to have larger GDP multipliers. Since these
issues are not addressed in this paper, they are left for future research.
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Chapter 2
(Not)Dancing Together:
Monetary Policy Stance and the
Government Spending Multiplier
(joint with Constant Lonkeng Ngouana, IMF)
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2.1 Introduction
The Great Recession has highlighted the role of fiscal policy as a counter-
cyclical tool that can be deployed alongside monetary policy when the econ-
omy is hit by a particularly large shock. In the aftermath of the crisis, fiscal
policy in advanced economies went from an expansionary phase (through a
wave of stimulus packages) to a consolidation phase, the latter with a view
to restoring fiscal sustainability. Monetary policy, however, was thought to
have remained mostly "accommodative" until the Fed’s "Taper Talk" in May
2013 and early signs of monetary policy normalization in United Kingdom.
Although the exit from unconventional monetary policy is likely to be highly
asynchronous across countries (with "Abenomics" 1 still unfolding in Japan
and the Euro area maintaining monetary policy accommodation to support
the recovery), fiscal policy will eventually confront the old monetary policy
normal. Understanding how the stance of monetary policy affects the size of
the government spending multiplier can therefore help inform our assessment
of the effectiveness of fiscal policy in advanced economies going forward.
The strong interplay between monetary and fiscal policy poses a challenge
to both policymakers and researchers as they try to disentangle the contri-
bution of each type of policy shock on the economy. Traditional models of
monetary and fiscal policy interaction, however, have focused mainly on pol-
icy coordination to provide a stable nominal anchor, in a non-cooperative
game between a government and its central bank. More recently, however,
a few papers have built on the new Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium framework to examine the size of the fiscal multiplier when the
Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate binds. The equilib-
rium outcome of the interaction between active/passive monetary and fiscal
policy has also been examined in the literature, also using the new Keynesian
set-up.
Despite the above recent theoretical contributions, the empirics of how the
response of output to government spending shocks varies with the stance of
monetary policy remain limited at best. This paper is an attempt to fill some
of that gap. We provide estimates of the government spending multiplier
under accommodative and non-accommodative monetary policy.
1. Abenomics, the economic plan put forward by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo¯
Abe, since his re-election in December 2012, entails three (complementary) "arrows": (i)
fiscal expansion (in the short-run); (ii) monetary easing (QE); and (iii) structural reforms.
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Central to our analysis is the identification of the state of monetary policy,
capturing the extent to which the Central Bank leans against the wind. More
explicitly, we approximate the reaction function of the U.S. Fed to the output
gap and inflation using a simple Taylor-type rule. 2 The extent of monetary
policy accommodation is then inferred from the deviation of the actual Fed
funds rate from the Taylor rule-implied rate, using a (smooth) transition
distribution, calibrated to reflect the average historical frequency of monetary
policy accommodation.
Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013], government spending shocks
are identified as forecast errors of the growth rate of government spending
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and from the Greenbook,
further stripped from their predictable components. 3 We also identify gov-
ernment spending shocks using the Cholesky decomposition as in Blanchard
and Perotti [2002], as a way to benchmarking our results, given the popularity
of that approach in the empirical literature.
To estimate the fiscal multiplier across states of monetary policy, we apply
the local projections method, pioneered by Jordà [2005] and applied recently
by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013] and Owyang et al. [2013], to U.S.
quarterly data. The local projections method, among many other desirable
features, does not impose the implicit dynamic restrictions inherent to Struc-
tural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs).
Our estimations suggest that the federal government spending multiplier is
substantially higher under accommodative than non-accommodative mon-
etary policy. Furthermore, our paper reconciles, within a unified frame-
2. This is broadly consistent with the "dual mandate" of the Fed, as articulated in
Section 2A (on monetary policy objectives) of the 1977 amendment of the Federal Reserve
Act: "The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates."
3. The Greenbook—officially entitled "Current Economic and Financial Conditions"—
provides an analysis of the U.S. and international economy. It is produced by the staff
of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and distributed to Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meeting’s participants one week prior to the meeting. We focus in this paper on
federal government spending, in line with the fact that monetary policy (characterizing
the state of the world in our framework) is conducted at the federal level. Also in the US,
States’ governments are fairly restricted to balanced budgets
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work, apparently contradictory findings in the literature: federal government
spending may crowd-in or crowd-out private consumption, depending on the
extent of monetary policy accommodation. Our results are robust to al-
ternative identification of the spending shock and of the state of monetary
policy, and to more disaggregated categories of consumption expenditures.
We explore two channels through which the stance of monetary policy may
impact the effectiveness of fiscal policy: the "substitution effect" (via the
real interest rate path) and the "wealth effect" (through the funding scheme
for government spending).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We end this section with a
brief review of the literature. Section 2.2 delineates our empirical strategy,
including the local projections method and our identification of the state of
monetary policy. Section 2.3 presents the estimation results on a sample
ending 2008Q4 and explores transmission channels. Section 2.4 presents es-
timation results on an extended sample to cover the ZLB episode and the
recent period where output has been below potential. Section 2.5 performs
some sensitivity analyses. Section 2.6 concludes, draws policy implications,
and explores possible extensions.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is at the intersection of two strands of the literature: the theoreti-
cal literature that studies the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy,
including when the ZLB on nominal interest rates binds; and the empirical
literature that examines the effects of fiscal policy, including state-dependent
fiscal multipliers.
Related to the theoretical strand of the literature, Davig and Leeper [2007]
estimate regime-switching rules for monetary policy and tax policy—assumed
to behave either actively or passively—over the post-war period in the United
States and integrate the estimated policy process into a calibrated DSGE
model with nominal rigidities. An active authority in the model pays no
attention to the level of government debt while passive authority responds
to shocks to government debt and is therefore constrained by the actions of
the active authority. The authors then simulate the effects of a tax-cut on
the U.S. economy across monetary and tax policy regimes. Davig and Leeper
[2011] use Davig and Leeper [2007]’s setting to simulate the macroeconomic
impact of changes in government spending when monetary and fiscal poli-
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cies interact. They find that an increase in government purchases induces a
stronger rise in consumption, output and inflation under a regime combining
passive monetary policy and active tax policy than a regime combining active
monetary policy and passive tax policy regime.
A few theoretical studies, building on the Keynesian DSGE framework, exam-
ine the effects of government spending when the ZLB on the nominal interest
rate binds (see, e.g., Christiano et al. [2011], Woodford [2011], Mertens and
Ravn [2014], among others). Simulations from these studies exhibit larger
output multipliers from government spending when the ZLB on the nominal
rates binds. The transmission channel, like in the case of passive monetary
policy, is the real interest rate. Expansionary fiscal policy induces higher
expectations for future inflation. Since the nominal interest rate is stuck
at zero, the real rate declines, inducing an expansion of the aggregate de-
mand. 4 This expansion of aggregate demand leads to a further increase in
inflation expectations and depresses the real rate further. Increased govern-
ment spending therefore breaks the deflationary spiral associated with the
ZLB. More recently, Gaspar [2015] finds that monetary policy transmission
is more uncertain when the interest rate is constrained by the ZLB (and un-
conventional monetary policy used), suggesting a potentially supportive role
for fiscal policy. 5
In connection with the empirical strand of the literature, an impressive vol-
ume of papers, using linear SVARs models have investigated the effects
of fiscal policy changes on macroeconomic outcomes, output in particular.
These studies mainly identify fiscal shocks either by the Cholesky decompo-
sition complemented with institutional information (see the seminal paper
by Blanchard and Perotti [2002], and Perotti [2004]), by the sign restrictions
(see Mountford and Uhlig [2009]), or using the narrative approach pioneered
by Romer and Romer [1989]. 6 While most papers find that government
4. The fact that the rate is stuck at zero of course does not prevent the monetary
authority from raising it. The constraint comes from the fact that the "notional" target
rate before the fiscal shock is already very negative and cannot be reached in practice
because the nominal rate is bounded from below by zero. The monetary authority may
therefore not be able to bring the rate up to the positive territory without running the
risk of plunging the economy into a deep recession.
5. These findings, focused particularly on the Euro area, are based on simulations from
the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model (GIMF)—a multi-region DSGE model
developed at the IMF (see Anderson et al. [2013])—and its subsequent extensions.
6. The authors use historical records to identify episodes during which large monetary
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spending increases output and crowd-out private investment, the response
of private consumption remains mixed. Some authors find that government
spending crowds-in private consumption (see, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti
[2002], Bouakez and Rebei [2007], Mountford and Uhlig [2009]), while oth-
ers, using the narrative approach to identifying exogenous changes in govern-
ment spending, find the opposite result (see, e.g., Ramey and Shapiro [1998],
Ramey [2011]).
Some authors have considered the non-linear effects of government spending.
Choi and Devereux [2006] investigate how changes in government purchases
affect the U.S. economy at different levels of real interest rates. They find
that expansionary government spending is more conductive to short-term
growth when real rates are low. Indeed, the Ricardian effect is smaller at
lower financing costs of fiscal policy. More recently, a number of papers have
investigated how the fiscal multiplier varies with the state of the economy (see
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012], Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013],
and Baum et al. [2012], among others). They generally find that an increase
in government spending has a substantially higher impact on output during
recessions than expansions. Recently, however, Owyang et al. [2013], using
newly constructed historical data for the US and Canada, find evidence of
higher multipliers during times of slack in Canada, but find no such evidence
for the United States.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature along several important di-
mensions: First, the state of the world in our non-linear model is charac-
terized by the stance of monetary policy, and not by the level of economic
activity (recessions or expansions), which has been the focus of many recent
papers on state-dependent fiscal multipliers. In fact, recessions and expan-
sions may themselves be the outcome of combined monetary and fiscal policy
actions—earlier findings that fiscal multipliers are higher in recessions might
well reflect the fact that monetary policy is likely to be accommodative in
recessions. Some papers have admittedly controlled for the level of the in-
terest rate (e.g., Belinga [2013] and Canova and Pappa [2011]), but we argue
that the level of the interest rate considered solely could be a poor proxy of
the state of monetary policy, which should ultimately be defined in light of
disturbances were not caused by output fluctuations. The method has since been adapted
to the fiscal realm to identify exogenous changes in tax policy and military spending
based on news reports (see, e.g., Romer and Romer [2010], Ramey and Shapiro [1998],
and Owyang et al. [2013], among others).
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macroeconomic conditions. In fact, a relatively low interest rate, otherwise
accommodative (in normal times), could be deemed non-accommodative if
the economy is in a deep recession and inflation expectations well-anchored.
The reverse could hold for a relatively high interest rate in an overheating
economy. We account for the behavior of the interest rate over the business
cycle, and explicitly characterize monetary policy by two states (accommoda-
tive and non-accommodative). Moreover, we ensure a smooth transition be-
tween the two states. More specifically, we infer the state of monetary policy
from the deviation of the actual Fed funds rate from the Taylor rule-implied
rate. The likelihood of being in either of the two states is higher in a given
period if the actual nominal rate deviates "enough" from the rate implied
by the "traditional" reaction function of the Fed to macroeconomic condi-
tions. This approach captures high frequency changes in monetary policy,
which is desirable, given the quite frequent occurrence of fiscal shocks (we
use quarterly data).
Second, we provide evidence that the existing tension over the crowding-
in/crowding-out effect of government spending on private consumption in
the literature may stem from previous studies not controlling for the state
of monetary policy. Also, we find that fiscal policy is more effective in the
United States at times of slack when monetary policy accommodates. The
latter result shades some light on Owyang et al. [2013] who, not controlling
for the state of monetary policy, find no evidence that fiscal policy is more
effective at times of slack in the United States.
Last but not least, the use of the local projections method allows us to
relax the implicit dynamic restrictions on the Impulse Response Functions
(IRFs) inherent to the alternative Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs)
method.
2.2 Econometric Model
2.2.1 Model Specification
We estimate the impulse response functions (IRFs) of macroeconomic vari-
ables (and output in particular) to a government spending shock across mon-
etary policy states, using the local projections method developed by Jordà
[2005] and applied recently by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013].
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The (state-dependent) response of a variable (e.g., output) to a government
spending shock (Gshockt), h periods ahead, is given by βhA in the accom-
modative state and by βhN in the non-accommodative state. These responses
are estimated directly for each horizon h (h = 0, 1, 2, ..., H) from the following
sequence of regressions:
yj,t+h =F (zt−1)
[
ψhA(L)Xt−1 + β
h
AGshockt
]
+ (1− F (zt−1))
[
ψhN(L)Xt−1 + β
h
NGshockt
]
+ ut
(2.1)
ut ∼ N(0, σ2t ), (2.2)
F (zt) =
exp(−γzt)
1 + exp(−γzt) , γ > 0, (2.3)
E(zt) = 0, var(zt) = 1, (2.4)
where yjt is our variable of interest, Xt = [Gt, Tt, Yt]′ is a set of controls, and
L is the lag operator. zt is an indicator of the stance of monetary policy,
normalized to have unit variance, making γ scale-invariant. There is no
clear-cut theoretical guidance in defining the index z. We compute z as the
deviation of the actual Fed funds rate from the Taylor rule-implied rate, with
large negative values (higher values of F (z)) signaling a higher likelihood of
monetary policy accommodation.
F (z) takes values between 0 and 1 and is decreasing in z. βA represents
the fiscal multiplier in a (sufficiently) deep monetary policy accommodation
(i.e., F (zt) ≈ 1) and βN represents the multiplier under non-accommodative
monetary policy (i.e., F (zt) ≈ 0 or equivalently 1−F (zt) ≈ 1). Interestingly,
F (0) = 1/2, which captures well the fact that it is equally likely to be in the
accommodative or non-accommodative state when the Fed funds rate exactly
matches the target rate. The parameter γ captures the speed at which one
(smoothly) moves from the accommodative to the non-accommodative mon-
etary policy state as z increases from large and negative values to positive
ones. It is calibrated to match the frequency of monetary policy accom-
modation in the data (see below). Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
[2013], we date the index z by t−1 in Equation 2.1 to avoid contemporaneous
feedbacks from fiscal policy actions into the state of monetary policy. 7
7. This is not too restrictive given that with local projections, the state of monetary
could adjust over the next quarter.
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The local projections approach has a number of advantages: First, it easily
accommodates state dependence and does not impose the implicit dynamic
restrictions on the IRFs inherent to SVARs. The fact that the response of
each endogenous variable is estimated separately allows one to economize
on the number of parameters to be pinned-down simultaneously, therefore
increasing the available degrees of freedom. In fact, unlike the VAR model
which requires several variables and lags to control for the effects of non-
exogenous shocks, 8 and therefore a significant loss of degrees of freedom, one
loses only up to H observations for the left-hand side variable in estimat-
ing Equation 2.1. 9 In addition, contrary to VARs, the lagged explanatory
variables are not needed to describe the dynamics of the dependent variable
conditional on the shock. 10 The parameters βhi , i ∈ {A,N} describe the
behavior of a variable at time t+ h in response to an exogenous government
spending shock that occurred at time t. In fact, the response of each endoge-
nous variable is estimated in isolation to other endogenous variable. The lag
structure ψA(L)Xt−1 in Equation 2.1 does not represent an internal dynamic
of the system, but is included simply to strip Gshock from predictable com-
ponents that would have been wiped-out had the professional Forecaster run
a VAR. 11
Second, the induced IRFs in a state-dependent VAR model implicitly assume
no change in the state variable. For instance, monetary policy could remain
accommodative even after a massive fiscal expansion. This assumption is
difficult to reconcile with a shock which may push output above potential,
overheating the economy. The local projections method does not constraint
monetary policy to be stuck in a given state forever, given that IRFs are
estimated directly at each horizon, rather than obtained recursively from
an estimated system. The coefficient βhi , i ∈ {A,N}, directly captures the
average effect of a government spending shock at horizon h when monetary
8. Including a large number of lags under the VAR allows the error term to be orthog-
onal to information contained in the past values of variables included in the VAR.
9. In fact, one loses no observation in estimating the impact multiplier and loses h
(h = 1, 2, ...,H) observations in estimating the h-periods ahead multiplier.
10. In VARs, the IRF that describes the dynamic of a variable following a shock is a com-
bination of the estimated parameters of lagged endogenous variables and the parameters
of the VAR-COV matrix of residuals.
11. The lag structure is indeed not indexed by h and therefore does not move with the
estimation horizon of the impact of the shock that occurs at time t on output h-period
ahead.
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policy is in the state i.
Third, one limit associated with the VAR model is the way spending multi-
pliers are computed. Real GDP and real government spending in the VAR-
system are usually expressed in the log-form. Therefore, the computed IRFs
give rise to elasticities but not spending multipliers per se. To convert the
percent changes to dollar equivalents, the IRFs are scaled by the inverse of
the sample average ratio of G/Y . This approach may bias the size of the
spending multiplier since the ratio G/Y tends to move substantially over the
sample period (see Figure A6 in the appendix). To allow the computed mul-
tiplier to be consistent with the variability in G/Y over time and following
Barro and Redlick [2011] and Owyang et al. [2013] we define the dependent
variable yt as
yt+h =
Yt+h − Yt−1
Yt−1
,
where Y is real GDP and
gt+h =
Gt+h −Gt−1
Yt−1
=
(
Gt+h −Gt−1
Gt−1
)
× Gt−1
Yt−1
,
where G is a measure of government spending. The multipliers are then
derived directly from the estimates of βhi , i ∈ {A,N} for government spending
and real GDP, using Equation 2.1.
Furthermore, the function F (z) induces a smooth transition between the
two states of monetary policy. This approach has a number of advantages.
First it allows one to control for the uncertainty surrounding an otherwise
(arbitrary) cut-off value of z for defining monetary policy accommodation.
Second, by discriminating across different values of the index z, the (smooth)
transition function captures the extent of monetary policy accommodation in
a continuous way—a minor deviation from the Taylor-rule implied rate would
be associated with a very low likelihood of being in either of the two states;
a large negative (positive) deviation would send a strong signal of monetary
policy accommodation (non-accommodation). Third, it limits the risk of
mis-classifying monetary policy states that may be brought about, e.g., by a
mis-specified Taylor rule. The smooth transition method is indeed a sharp
departure from the alternative of estimating the fiscal multiplier separately
for each regime, which would reduce the number of degrees of freedom if the
number of realizations of the accommodative state is limited. The threshold
regression approach does not suffer from the latter drawback, but fails to
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capture the uncertainty surrounding the turning point associated with the
non-linear effects of fiscal policy across the states of monetary policy.
The smooth transition method, however, delivers estimates for extreme ac-
commodation and non-accommodation, while the extent of monetary policy
accommodation is likely to be somewhere in-between these two polar cases
in reality. Also, the local projections approach requires that the shock be
identified exogenously.
2.2.2 Data
We estimate the model using U.S. quarterly data over the period 1965Q4–
2012Q4. Our sample does not go further back in time because our identifica-
tion of (unanticipated) government spending shocks relies on data from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Greenbook, which starts
only in 1965.
The state of monetary policy in our baseline estimations is identified only
through 2008Q4 because the Fed funds rate used in the identification has
been constrained by the ZLB since December 2008 and therefore has (tem-
porally) ceased to be an appropriate indicator of the Fed’s monetary policy
stance. Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP) tools have since included
assets purchases, with effects on the long end of the yield curve, and not
on the Fed funds rate itself. 12 Also, the level of the potential output is
currently surrounded by lot of uncertainty. 13 To account for these recent de-
velopments, we first run estimations on a sample through 2008Q4. We then
present results on an extended sample that nests the ZLB episode. Because
the ZLB constraint indeed became active only post-2008Q4, the sample is
extended through 2012Q4, using estimates of the shadow Fed funds rate—the
effective policy rate when UMP is accounted for (see sub-Section 2.4)—over
2009Q1–2012Q4.
The estimation of Equation 2.1 uses real GDP, a measure of real government
12. Our estimations, however, do include the contemporaneous impact of a government
spending shock that occurred in 2009Q1 (e.g., the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act), conditional on the state of monetary policy in 2008Q4 (see Equation 2.1 above).
13. This is because our estimation of the Taylor-rule uses the output gap, obtained as
the deviation of actual output from its potential level. There is indeed an extensive debate
about whether the global financial crisis has had a permanent effect on output.
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purchases 14 and real tax revenues (direct and indirect tax receipts and social
security contributions) net of transfers payment, all expressed in log-form.
Aggregate real GDP, aggregate real consumption and its components, real
private fixed investment, and real federal government spending (all in billions
of chained 2009 dollars) are from the historical database maintained by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Military spending, tax revenues net
of transfers, and federal debt are from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) or the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Real net tax revenues and real federal
debt are obtained by dividing their nominal values by the GDP deflator,
expressed in the base year 2009. The Real value of each spending component
is obtained by dividing the nominal value from NIPA by the (specific) price
index of that component, expressed in the base year 2009. 15 The output
gap—used in the estimation of the Taylor-type rule—is the deviation of the
actual output from its potential, obtained from the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO). Finally, the unemployment rate and the civilian employment-
population ratio are from the FRED.
2.2.3 Determining the State of Monetary Policy
We qualify monetary policy as being accommodative when the Fed does not
raise the policy rate more than it "traditionally" does in response to macroe-
conomic developments, based on its estimated (historical) reaction function.
We capture the reaction function of the Fed to macroeconomic conditions
by means of a Taylor-type rule (see Taylor [1993]), following Clarida et al.
[1998]. These authors assume that within each period, the Central Bank has
a target for the nominal short term interest rate, i∗t , which depends on both
the expected inflation and the deviation of output from potential.
i?t = i¯+ β(Etpit+n − pi?) + γ(Etyt − y?t ), (2.5)
where i¯ is the steady-state short term nominal interest rate, pi? is the inflation
target of monetary authorities and y?t is the potential output.
To account for the observed autocorrelation in interest rates, it is assumed
that the nominal rate adjusts to its target level only gradually. Abrupt policy
14. We use government purchases and government spending interchangeably in the pa-
per.
15. We proceed this way because spending components expressed in real terms are avail-
able only since 1999Q1 in the NIPA or FRED database.
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reversals could indeed disrupt capital markets or undermine credibility. The
adjustment equation reads:
it = (1− ρ)i?t + ρit−1 + t, (2.6)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the smoothing parameter.
From 2.5 and 2.7 and after some arrangements, one gets:
it = (1−ρ)(¯i−βpi?)+(1−ρ)βEtpit+n+(1−ρ)γ(Etyt−y?t )+ρit−1 + t (2.7)
For the empirical specification we use the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) as
a measure of the short-term nominal interest rate, the one-quarter ahead
projection of inflation piat obtained from the SPF,
16 and a measure of the
output-gap. It is standard practice in the literature to use the Fed funds rate
as the monetary policy indicator, although the sample may include periods
in which the Fed was not explicitly targeting the funds rate. This concern is
mitigated by the fact that alternative monetary policy targets would arguably
be correlated with the Fed funds rate.
We estimate the following reduced-from Taylor-rule equation:
FFRt = α + ρFFRt−1 + γpipiat + γy(yt − y?t ) + t, (2.8)
with α = (1− ρ)(¯i− βpi?), γpi = (1− ρ)β and γy = (1− ρ)γ.
We then compute an index of the monetary policy stance, z, as the deviation
of the actual Fed funds rate from its estimated level obtained from fitting the
reaction function of the Fed to the expected inflation and the actual output
gap:
zt = (FFRt − F̂FRt) (2.9)
z averages 0 by construction (estimation residual) and is normalized to have
unit variance. 17
16. We also use alternative measures of inflation, including the actual inflation rate, to
estimate the Taylor rule and our results remain unaltered.
17. The estimated Taylor-type rule over 1965Q4–2008Q4 is given by the equation below,
where standards errors are in parentheses:
F̂FRt = −0.012
(0.167)
+ 0.897
(0.032)
FFRt−1 + 0.179
(0.080)
piat + 0.138
(0.031)
(yt − y∗t ).
These estimates suggest that the Fed tends to put more emphasis on inflation, and there
is quite some interest rate smoothing, both consistent with the existing literature.
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Although the approximation of the Fed’s reaction function by a Taylor-type
rule is consistent with the Fed mandate under the Federal Reserve Act, the
value of z could in principle also capture, in some instances, omitted variables
(e.g., if the Fed did shift its focus to other aggregates than the output gap
and inflation at a given point in time). For instance, unemployment became
a major focus of policymaking in the aftermath of the great recession, on
account of the jobless recovery. Also, the policy rate is unlikely to be orthog-
onal to (now) increased financial stability concerns. The risk that z may not
reflect the stance of monetary policy is, however, mitigated by a number of
factors: (i) we estimated the Fed’s reaction function over a relatively long
period of time (and the sample is limited to the pre-crisis episode); and (ii)
our identification of the state of monetary policy during the crisis and post-
crisis episodes, over which unemployment and financial stability concerns
became more prominent, accounts for the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate and the ensuing deployment of unconventional monetary poli-
cies tools (see Section 2.4). In addition, smooth transition between the two
states of monetary policy (see below) further limits the risk that the stance
of monetary policy be poorly identified—the value of z (simply) informs the
likelihood of being in a given state.
It is worth emphasizing that our approach for identifying the state of mon-
etary policy—unlike some existing studies on the non-linear effects of fiscal
policy in relation to monetary policy—accounts for prevailing macroeconomic
conditions. For instance, Freedman et al. [2010] define monetary accommo-
dation as instances in which the interest rate is kept constant for one or two
years. Our approach is consistent with Morgan [1993]’s who identifies mone-
tary policy tightening/easing using residuals from the regression of the level
of the Fed funds rate on its own lags, current and lagged values of output
growth and inflation, in testing for the asymmetric effects of monetary policy
in the U.S. economy.
Although the extent of monetary policy accommodation (z) is defined here
in reference to macroeconomic conditions, z may also reflect the extent of
monetary policy accommodation with respect to the fiscal shock, given that
the Fed would arguably increase the interest rate following an increase in
government spending only to the extend that the fiscal action feeds inflation
expectations or push output above potential (see Romer and Romer [2014]
for a similar issue). This conjecture is confirmed ex-post: we find that the
Fed funds rate falls following a positive federal spending shock under accom-
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modative monetary policy, though inflation rises. As a consequence, the real
interest rate falls even sharper (see Section 2.3.3).
F (z) denotes the probability of being in the accommodative state for a given
value of z. 18 With this characterization, we can easily incorporate the fact
that fiscal policy shocks, by affecting output, can alter the monetary policy
stance. 19 We calibrate the parameter γ so that monetary policy remains
accommodative for about 30 percent of time in our sample and perform
some sensitivity analyses with respect to that frequency. Assuming that
monetary policy is accommodative if F (zt) > 0.8, γ is obtained as solution
to the equation: Pr(F (z) > 0.8) = 0.3. Solving this equation—using the
cumulative distribution of F—yields γ = 5. We choose this parametrisation
because we are particularly interested in episodes which are very sharp and
clearly indicative of a change in the Fed’s monetary policy stance. Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko [2012] obtained a smaller value for γ of 1.5, reflecting the
fact that recessions (their focus) are less frequent in the data (they occur 20
percent of the time, based on NBER recession dating). Our higher value of
γ is conservative as it implies a faster move from the accommodative to the
non-accommodative monetary state. This would result in a smaller scope for
discriminating between the two states—too "close" to each other—when it
comes to the effectiveness of fiscal policy (the sensitivity analyses around the
parametrization of γ is discussed in Section 2.5).
The estimated Taylor-rule delivers expected coefficients, with the Fed being
more aggressive vis-a-vis inflation than towards the output gap. We also
find strong evidence of interest rate smoothing, typical in the estimated of
the Fed’s reaction function—not surprisingly, the policy rate does not jump
around. Figure 2.1 portrays the Fed funds rate and F (z) over our sample
period. The shared areas correspond to recessions, as identified by the NBER
Business Cycles Dating Committee.
A number of observations can be drawn from Figure 2.1: (i) The post-war
18. Monetary policy is supposed to be in either of the accommodative or non-
accommodative state at any point in time.
19. As an alternative to our approach, one could be tempted to define monetary policy
accommodation as instances in which the deviation of the federal funds rate from the target
rate is below a given threshold z0 (i.e., zt ≤ z0), with non-accommodation corresponding
to the opposite case. We explore this approach by estimating z0 by mean of a threshold
regression. The results, however, tend to be highly sensitive to small perturbations to the
estimated threshold, undermining confidence to that approach.
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Figure 2.1 – The Fed Funds Rate and the Likelihood of Being in the Accom-
modative State
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Notes: The first panel chart portrays the Federal funds rate and the second panel chart
displays the probability of being in the accommodative state of monetary policy. Shaded
bars represent NBER recession dates.
dynamics of the Fed funds rate display two broad phases: an episode of
rising Fed funds rate through 1981, and an episode of declining rate post-
1981. As such, controlling for the level of the interest rate as done in previous
studies may not capture the full extent of changes that occurred in the U.S.
monetary policy stance over time (first panel chart); (ii) Our identification
scheme suggests a high likelihood of monetary policy being accommodative
in some episodes of rising interest rate (second panel chart), a fact that would
not be captured if one simply considers the level of the interest rate; and (iii)
F (z) is greater than 0.8 over the sample period in almost all the recession
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dates, indicating an overall accommodative stance during recessions. Our
identification may therefore nest the framework that examines the size of the
fiscal multiplier over the business cycle. In fact, Robert Hall in his comments
on Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013] (see Alesina and Giavazzi [2013])
notes that the state of the economy as identified by the authors may simply
reflect various phases in US monetary policy. Interestingly, our identification
suggests that monetary policy was at times accommodative outside recession
episodes, making our framework broader in scope.
One challenge associated with our identification strategy is the treatment of
the ZLB episode. In fact the index z is, by construction, biased upward when
the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB. This is because the estimated Taylor-
rule rate (F̂RRt) is unbounded, while the actual interest rate is bounded
from below. We extend the identification of the monetary policy state to the
ZLB episode, using alternative methods in Section 2.4.
2.3 Estimation Results (sample ending in 2008Q4)
For each regression h (h = 0, 1, 2, ..., H) of Equation 2.1, we use 4 lags of
X, and following Owyang et al. [2013], we add a quartic trend. 20 Govern-
ment spending shocks (Gshock) are identified using two approaches. We first
examine the case in which government spending shocks are identified using
the Cholesky decomposition (quite standard in the VAR-like approach). We
subsequently turn to a measure of unanticipated government spending shocks
which controls for expectations.
2.3.1 Government Spending Shocks Identified Using the
Cholesky Decomposition
As a starting point, we identify shocks to government spending (Gshockt)
as residuals of the projection of log of Gt on the lagged values of log of
Xt = [Gt,Tt,Yt]
′, common in the literature. Innovations from this projec-
tion are equivalent to those that would be generated by a SVAR in which
shocks are identified using the Cholesky decomposition whereby the govern-
ment spending variable is ranked first. Delays in adopting/implementating
government spending measures (e.g., due to the parliamentarian process) are
20. The coefficients of the trend are not state-dependent.
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indeed such that they may not affect output within a quarter (see the semi-
nal paper by Blanchard and Perotti [2002]). Equation 2.1 is then estimated
using the resulting series Gshockt employing the Newey-West estimator.
Estimation results suggest that federal government purchases are expansion-
ary and have a highly persistent impact, 21 with output increasing for many
quarters after the shocks (see appendix, Figure A8). It is worth noting that
our linear model generates government spending multipliers that are well
within the range of those found in the literature: the impact multiplier of
U.S. federal government spending is around 1.7 upon impact (one-year cu-
mulative). For comparison purposes, we also use military spending, and find
that they tend to be more expansionary (the induced multiplier is around
2), consistent with earlier findings in the literature. The peak output multi-
plier is also the largest for military spending. 22 Our non-linear estimations
also suggest that the response of output to the federal government spend-
ing shock depends on the state of monetary policy that prevails at the time
of the shock—the increase in output is higher when monetary policy is ac-
commodative and for many quarters after the shock (see detailed discussion
below). 23
2.3.2 Government Spending Shocks Identified as Fore-
cast Errors
One criticism associated with the above identification strategy is that these
shocks might be forecastable because fiscal policy changes are anticipated in
advance due to the time lag between their adoption by the Legislative and
their implementation—see Ramey [2011] on the critical role of the timing of
21. We also looked at the response of GDP to government investment spending versus
government current consumption. Results, not reported suggest a highly persistent impact
of government investment on GDP relative to the impact of government current consump-
tion. When identifying government spending shocks as forecast errors, we only focus on
aggregate federal spending because forecasts of government purchases are available only
at the aggregate level.
22. detailed results associated with defense spending shocks are available upon request.
23. This result is consistent with Freedman et al. [2010] who find, using simulations from
a multi-region DSGE model (see Anderson et al. [2013]), that multipliers of two-year fiscal
stimulus are higher when the interest rate is kept constant for one or two years. It is also
consistent with simulations in Coenen et al. [2010]. But our analysis differs from those
studies in that it is empirical in nature and our identification of the state of monetary
policy accounts for macroeconomic conditions (see discussion above).
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fiscal shocks in pinning-down the effect of fiscal shocks. Even including a
large number of lags could fail to capture these anticipated future changes
in fiscal policy. For this reason, we use a measure of a surprise government
spending shock. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012], we identify
unanticipated government spending shocks as forecasts errors of the growth
rate of government purchases:
FEGt = ∆logGt − Et−1∆logGt
We construct our forecast series of real government spending growth from
two sources: the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Greenbook
record. SPF data is only available since 1981. We complement that source
with the Greenbook record prepared by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board
ahead of the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since
1965. Our series of government spending shocks therefore cover the period
from 1965 to 2012. Because of many revisions in national accounts data,
we follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] in using growth rates (rather
than levels) of real federal spending. More specifically, we first constitute
series of forecasts of real federal spending from one-quarter-ahead projections
available from the Greenbook up to 1984. We then take the one-quarter
ahead forecast of federal spending from the SPF, available since 1981, from
which we back out the real growth rate. Finally, to have a complete series of
expected real growth of federal spending, we splice both series of expected
growth of real spending. The series of forecast errors are then obtained as
the difference between actual real growth of federal spending and their one-
quarter ahead projection made in the previous quarter. Finally, to purify our
series of government spending shocks from predictable changes in the growth
rate of government spending that would have been foreseen by professional
forecasters, we include lagged values of government spending, net taxes, and
output to the local projections (Equation 2.1).
Is there any empirical case for using SPF/Greenbook as sources of identifica-
tion of government spending shocks rather than relying on the (traditional)
Cholesky decomposition? To provide an answer to that question, we project
actual real federal spending growth and their forecasts on the lags of real
federal spending, real GDP and real tax revenues expressed in log-term. As
shown in Figure 2.2, the two series of residuals obtained from those projec-
tions are correlated, with a coefficient of correlation of about 0.3. When we
regress the series of residuals from actual federal spending growth equation on
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the series of residuals from the forecasts of federal spending growth equation,
we find a coefficient of 0.5, significant at 5 percent significance level.
Figure 2.2 – Predictability of Innovations from the Cholesky Decomposition
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Notes: This figure shows residuals of projecting actual real federal growth spend-
ing on lags of real federal spending, real GDP and real tax revenues expressed
in log (vertical-axis) and residuals of the projection of forecasts of real federal
spending growth on the same variables. The correlation between the two series
of residuals is 0.3. The projection of the first series on the second delivers a
coefficient of 0.5 with a standard error of 0.13. The grid area is the 95 percent
confidence interval around the fitted values.
These findings suggest that innovations from the VAR-like approach are
somewhat predictable (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] present a simi-
lar evidence). Our preferred approach is therefore one in which government
spending shocks are identified as forecast errors of the growth rate of gov-
ernment spending from SPF/Greenbook. 24 This is the approach adopted in
all the estimations presented below.
24. Government spending shocks identified with the VAR-like approach might be pre-
dictable in the sense that, the information set available to the econometrician is limited
when running a VAR. Even including more lags should not purified the shocks from all their
predictable components. By contrast, professional forecasters have a broader information
set than the econometrician. Forecasts errors from SPF/Greenbook should therefore be
more likely to be purified from any predictable changes that would have been foreseen by
professional forecasters.
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2.3.2.1 Results for aggregate output
Figure 2.3 displays the IRFs of output and federal spending to a "surprise"
federal spending shock (as identified in sub-Section 2.3.2), in the linear case
(first Column) and across the two states of monetary policy: accommoda-
tive state (second Column) and non-accommodative state (third Column).
Gray shaded regions represent the 95 percent confidence bands around the
estimates. Given the relatively small number of observations in the accom-
modative state (about 30 percent of the sample), the associated confidence
bands are slightly wider than in the non-accommodative state.
Clearly, the response of output is conditional on the state of monetary policy:
output increases to a large extent following a federal spending shock when
monetary policy accommodates, while it falls, albeit not significantly, when
monetary policy does not accommodate. This result holds over time and
is consistent with the findings in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012]. The
authors find that government spending tend to be slightly recessionary during
expansions when expectations are controlled for.
Because the response of output (and other aggregates) depends on the per-
sistence of the response of government spending (different across the two
states of monetary policy), we report in Table 2.1 and subsequent tables two
measures of "normalized" spending multipliers: (i) the "cumulative multi-
plier" (one-year, two-year, and four-year integral), defined as the ratio of the
sum of the response of output over the sum of the response of government
spending through that period; and (ii) the "peak multiplier" defined as the
ratio of the response of output and government spending at their respective
peaks. These measures of spending multipliers are common in the literature
(see Owyang et al. [2013] and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2013]).
Estimation results suggest that output increases by 2.5 dollars within a
year for a dollar increase in federal spending when monetary policy is ac-
commodative and decreases by 1.6 dollars when monetary policy is non-
accommodative. The peak multiplier when the accommodative state prevails
is equal 5.5 and only equals 2.8 under non-accommodative monetary policy.
The magnitude of our estimated multipliers under monetary policy accommo-
dation are consistent with Christiano et al. [2011] who, using a DSGE frame-
work, finds an output multiplier of 3.7 at the ZLB under their benchmark
specification. We note that one should interpret the multipliers obtained here
for the two states of monetary policy as polar values—they correspond to
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sufficiently deep monetary policy accommodation and non-accommodation.
The extent of monetary policy accommodation is likely to be in-between
these two extremes in reality.
Although the patterns of the results are broadly similar across the two ap-
proaches to identifying fiscal shocks (see Table 2.1), two notable differences
emerge: (i) The multiplier upon impact is much lower using our preferred
measure of government spending shock (derived from forecast errors from
SPF/Greenbook), estimated at 0.6, against 1.5 with the Cholesky decompo-
sition, a result that is reversed over time; and (ii) controlling for the role of
anticipations seems to increase the discriminatory role of monetary policy
(fiscal multipliers across the accommodative and non-accommodative states
are more apart with the measure of unanticipated shocks). These two el-
ements highlight the need to control for anticipations in estimating fiscal
multipliers.
2.3.2.2 Results for disaggregated output
Figure 2.4 portrays the response of total private consumption to a (surprise)
federal government spending shock. Under accommodative monetary pol-
icy, federal government spending significantly and persistently crowds-in pri-
vate consumption, while private consumption is somewhat crowded-out when
monetary policy is non-accommodative. Surprisingly, the state of monetary
policy does not seem to discriminate the response of private investment (see
appendix, Figure A9). This result might be driven by the composition of
federal government spending and how it is financed. It may also reflect the
response of inventories over the business cycle.
We also examine the response of disaggregated private consumption into
durable goods, and non-durable goods and services and the above finding
on aggregate private consumption holds across its major components: fed-
eral government spending significantly and persistently crowds-in consump-
tion of durable goods and non-durables goods and services under accom-
modative monetary policy, while these consumption components tend to be
crowded-out under non-accommodative monetary policy. Table A3 in ap-
pendix presents the multipliers for aggregate and disaggregated private con-
sumption and private investment at various horizons (cumulative multipliers)
and at their maximum (peak multiplier).
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Figure 2.3 – IRFs of Federal Government Spending and Output to Federal Gov-
ernment Spending Shocks
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Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence bands around the estimates.
Table 2.1 – GDP Cumulative and Peak Multipliers: "Cholesky" vs. "SPF/Greenbook"
Federal Spending Shocks
1-year 2-year 4-year Ratio of peak
integral integral integral responses
Shocks identified with the
Cholesky decomposition
Linear 1.53 2.07 2.83 3.27
Non accommodative 0.60 1.46 2.12 2.59
Accommodative 2.46 2.79 3.41 4.19
Shocks identified with
SPF/Greenbook forecast errors
Linear 0.60 1.63 3.44 5.04
Non accommodative -1.55 -1.97 -0.22 2.76
Accommodative 2.50 3.96 4.48 5.51
Notes: Cumulative multipliers are computed as the ratio of the sum of responses of GDP and govern-
ment spending. The peak measure is the ratio of the IRFs at their respective peaks.
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Figure 2.4 – IRFs of Private Consumption
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Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence regions around the estimates.
2.3.3 Transmission Channels
We explore two channels that might explain our findings: (i) the "substitution
effect" through the real interest rate path; and (ii) the "wealth effect" through
the funding scheme for federal government spending.
The path of the real interest rate conceptually matters for the effectiveness
of fiscal policy. For instance, when the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB
in New Keynesian models, an increase in government spending induces a de-
cline in the real interest rate, as inflation rises and the nominal rate remains
constant. The decline in the real rate in turns boosts private spending and
aggregate demand. Even beyond the ZLB, the response of the short term
nominal rate to inflation, reflecting the stance of monetary policy would af-
fect the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Accommodative monetary authorities
may for instance not necessarily increase the short term rate in response to
the spending shock, which would prompt inflation to rise more than other-
wise. As a consequence, the real interest rate declines, boosting aggregate
demand. To test this conjecture, we compute the response to federal gov-
ernment spending shock of the Feds fund rate, inflation, and two measures
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of the real interest rate across our monetary policy states (accommodative
and non-accommodative): (i) the ex-ante real interest defined as the differ-
ence between actual nominal rate and the one-quarter ahead projection of
inflation (from SPF): rrat = FFRt − piat ; and (ii) the ex-post real interest
rate defined as the measure between actual nominal rate and the realized
inflation rate rrpt = FFRt − pit+1. In this context, we estimate the local
projections equation (see Equation 2.1), adding the interest rate or inflation
to the set of variables Xt. We find that the nominal interest declines in
response to the spending shock while inflation rises, under accommodative
monetary policy. The opposite holds under non-accommodative monetary
stance. As a consequence, the two measures of real interest rate decline in
response to a federal spending shock under accommodative monetary and
increase under non-accommodative monetary policy (see Figure 2.5 for the
response of the (nominal) Fed funds rate and Figure 2.6 for the response of
the ex-ante real rate). This, we believe, is a nice feature of our monetary
policy states. In fact, although identified with respect to macroeconomic
conditions (output gap and inflation) ex-ante, our monetary states mimic a
direct reaction of monetary authorities to fiscal shocks ex-post—the nominal
and real interest rates decline (increase) following a government spending
shock under the accommodative (non-accommodative) state. The monetary
and fiscal authorities may therefore dance together or not in practice.
Figure A10 in the Appendix displays the response of real federal debt to
a shock to federal government spending. Real debt increases under accom-
modative monetary policy and decreases when monetary policy is not accom-
modative. Interestingly, we find that the response of real tax (not reported)
does not depend on the state of monetary policy. These two results seem to
suggest that federal spending are financed mostly with debt at lower financing
costs (under accommodative monetary policy). 25 The decline in real inter-
est rate, coupled with debt financing of spending may therefore explain the
stronger response of output and private consumption under accommodative
monetary policy.
25. The low financing cost may therefore mitigate any ricardian-effect that would prevail.
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Figure 2.5 – IRFs of the (Nominal) Fed Funds Rate
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Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence bands around the estimates.
Figure 2.6 – IRFs of the Real Fed Funds Rate
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2.4 Estimation Results (sample covering the re-
cent ZLB episode)
2.4.1 Identification of the State of Monetary Policy at
the ZLB and Estimated Multipliers
In a recent paper, Christiano et al. [2014] emphasize the critical role of the
zero lower bound (interacting with financial frictions) in accounting for move-
ments in aggregate real economic activity during the Great Recession. Be-
cause of the uncertainty surrounding the state of monetary policy at the ZLB,
our above estimations covered a sample ending in 2008Q4. We examine in
this section how our results change when the sample is extended through
2012Q4, using alternative approaches. One challenge is indeed that our in-
dex of monetary policy accommodation (defined as the difference between
the actual Fed funds rate and the target rate) is biased upward when the Fed
funds rate is stuck at 0. In fact, at 16 basis points in December 2008, the Fed
funds rate de facto reached the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate
and was no longer an appropriate indicator to assessing the Fed’s monetary
policy stance. 26 In an attempt to relax financing conditions in the U.S. econ-
omy further, as the short-term rate was stuck at zero, the Federal Reserve has
deployed a number of unconventional monetary policy tools. These included
large-scale asset purchase programs (QE), and forward guidance, a new com-
munication toolkit aims at signaling the future course of monetary policy to
the public. 27 These policy measures have essentially affected the long end
of the yield curve—long term interest rates have (temporarily) become the
Fed’s intermediate targets. Many researchers have since tried to assess the
effectiveness of these unconventional monetary policy tools, an uncharted
territory. One related question—of particular interest for the identification
of the state of monetary policy adopted in this paper—is the level of the Fed
funds rate that would generate the observed yield curve if the rate was not
constrained (i.e could take negative values).
In that context, Wu and Xia [2014] develop a nonlinear term structure model
26. The nominal interest rate is bounded by 0 from below because holding cash is always
a better (available) alternative option than borrowing at 0 or negative interest rate.
27. Forward guidance has recently consisted for the Fed in stating that the policy rate
will be kept low as long as some amount of slack remains in the economy (unemployment
rate below 6.5 percent) or the recovery remains fragile.
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to summarize the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policy
at the ZLB. In particular the authors generate series of a "shadow" Fed funds
rate from 2009Q1 to date. 28 Interestingly, the shadow rate coincides with the
actual rate prior to 2008Q4. We first use these series to extend our sample
of monetary policy state. More explicitly, we generate the target rate for the
period from 2009Q1 to 2012Q4 during which the ZLB was binding in our
sample, by fitting the actual values of the expected inflation and the output
gap to our estimated Taylor rule. We then compute the index z of monetary
policy accommodation as in Equation 2.9, and the function F (z) capturing
the likelihood of being in the accommodative state. Finally, we re-estimate
the (monetary policy state-dependent) government spending multiplier on
the extended sample.
Table 2.2 – GDP Cumulative and Peak Multipliers (extended sample through
2012Q4)
1 year 2 years 4 years Ratio of peak
integral integral integral responses
ZLB: Wu and Xia [2014]
Linear -0.58 -0.29 1.61 2.79
Non accommodative -2.89 -3.97 -1.16 1.63
Accommodative 1.72 2.52 2.97 3.68
ZLB: Own calculations
Linear -0.58 -0.29 1.61 2.79
Non accommodative -2.00 -3.09 -0.86 1.54
Accommodative 1.47 2.45 3.01 3.77
ZLB: Lombardi and Zhu [2014]
Linear -0.58 -0.29 1.61 2.79
Non accommodative -1.71 -2.13 -0.40 1.67
Accommodative 1.01 1.84 2.76 3.57
Notes: Cumulative multipliers are computed as the ratio of the sum of responses of GDP and govern-
ment spending. The peak measure is the ratio of the IRFs at their respective peaks.
As robustness check of our identification of the state of monetary policy at
the ZLB, we also use the shadow rate series generated by Lombardi and Zhu
[2014]. 29 We also construct an alternative measure, assuming (naively) that
28. The series, including their description, are available on the web site of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta: www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/researchcq/shadow_rate.cfm.
29. Our preferred series of the shadow rate are those from Wu and Xia [2014], partly
58
changes in the 10-year US rate reflect change that would have affected the
Fed funds rate if the latter was unconstrained. Although the three methods
deliver estimates of the shadow rate that are quite different quantitatively,
they all suggest a shadow Fed funds rate that is broadly in the negative
territory during the ZLB episode (see Figure A7 in appendix). Interestingly,
our main qualitative result that the federal spending multiplier is higher
under accommodative than under non-accommodative monetary policy is
unaltered in all the three cases. Table 2.2 portrays our estimation results for
the (surprise) federal government spending shock from SPF/Greenbook. The
corresponding IRFs under accommodative and non-accommodative states,
using Wu and Xia [2014]’s measure of the shadow rate, are displayed in
Figure A11 in appendix. 30 To put these results in perspective, Figure A13
in appendix portrays our characterization of the state of monetary policy
overtime, including under the recent UMP. It suggests that monetary policy
became accommodative only progressively after the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate had become binding. 31 Also, Figure A14 in appendix
traces the cumulative fiscal multiplier overtime, along with the dating of our
(extreme) monetary policy accommodation (F (z) > 0.8). As in Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko [2012], there is quite some variability in state-dependent
fiscal multipliers overtime with, in our case, usually higher multipliers when
monetary policy accommodates.
Our estimations also indicate that the federal government spending multiplier
is lower at all horizons (linear model) when the sample is extended through
2012Q4. Also, although it is still much higher compare to the case of non-
accommodative monetary policy, the fiscal multiplier in the accommodative
state of monetary policy is lower on the extended sample that covers the
recent ZLB episode. These findings are consistent with recent contributions
because of the high volatility of the series in Lombardi and Zhu [2014], which seems at
odd with interest rate smoothing. Christiano et al. [2014] also provide a specification for
the shadow Fed funds rate in a DSGE set-up.
30. The IRFs corresponding to the two other measures of the shadow rate are available
upon request.
31. Interestingly, the extent of monetary policy accommodation increases when we use
a former vintage (Fall 2013) of the output gap from CBO to evaluating the Taylor-rule
implied rate. The identification of the state of monetary policy for the remainder of the
sample period, however, is robust across vintages of the output gap data. This hetero-
geneity stems from the fact that, while the output gap had been underestimated across
the board, the underestimation was more pronounced for the post-crisis episode for which
the output potential was recently marked-down significantly.
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in the theoretical literature on the size of the fiscal multiplier at the ZLB.
In fact, while Christiano et al. [2011] find an output multiplier of 3.7 in
the benchmark specification of their DSGE model, Mertens and Ravn [2014]
show that the size of the fiscal multiplier when the zero lower bound binds is
reduced in a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence.
2.4.2 What Happens at Times of Slack?
As a bridge between our analysis and former studies that examine how the
fiscal multiplier varies with the state of the economy, we re-estimate Equation
2.1, distinguishing between periods of "slack" and periods of "non-slack".
The amount of slack in the economy is captured by the unemployment rate.
Following Owyang et al. [2013], we use 6.5 percent as the threshold, which
is also in line with the recent Fed’s forward guidance. This value of the
threshold implies that the U.S. economy spends about one-third of the time
in slack. This is higher than the 20 percent time proportion that the U.S.
economy spends in recession, as implied by the information from the NBER
Business Cycle Dating Committee (see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012]).
The relatively high frequency of slack is consistent with the fact that some
economic recoveries are "jobless". 32
Table 2.3 – GDP Cumulative and Peak Multipliers at Time of Slack and Non-slack
(extended sample through 2012Q4)
1 year 2 years 4 years Ratio of peak
integral integral integral responses
Linear -0.58 -0.29 1.61 2.79
Non-slack -1.04 -0.46 1.51 3.63
Slack -0.15 -0.26 1.83 2.55
Notes: Cumulative multipliers are computed as the ratio of the sum of responses of GDP and
government spending. The peak measure is the ratio of the IRFs at their respective peaks.
We generally do not find broad support to higher government spending mul-
tiplier at times of slack in the U.S. economy when the state of monetary
policy is not accounted for (see Table 2.3). This is consistent with recent
findings by Owyang et al. [2013], using newly constructed historical U.S.
32. Assuming the same 20 percent share for slack as for recessions would imply a cut-off
unemployment rate of 7.3 percent. Some sensitivity analyses on the value of the threshold
for characterizing the slack leave our qualitative results unaltered.
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quarterly data from 1890 to 2010. Our estimations suggest, however, that
federal government spending are highly effective at times of slack if mone-
tary policy is accommodative, but are contractionary otherwise. Figure 2.7
clearly highlights the sharp contraction of output when monetary policy does
not accommodate during slack. We also compute the response of employ-
ment and unemployment to a federal spending shock at times of slack and
the non-linear effects with respect to the state of monetary policy are sim-
ilar to those of output (see Figure A12 in appendix for the response of the
employment).
Figure 2.7 – IRFs of Output at Times of Slack (extended sample, including the
ZLB episode)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−2
0
2
4
G: Linear case (Slack)
D
o
ll
a
r
s
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
GDP: Linear case (Slack)
Quarters
D
o
ll
a
r
s
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−2
0
2
4
G: Accommodative Monetary policy (Slack)
D
o
ll
a
r
s
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
GDP: Accommodative Monetary Policy (Slack)
Quarters
D
o
ll
a
r
s
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−2
0
2
4
G: Non−accommodative Monetary policy (Slack)
D
o
ll
a
r
s
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
GDP: Non−accommodative Monetary Policy (Slack)
Quarters
D
o
ll
a
r
s
Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence regions around the esti-
mates.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We investigate the robustness of our results along two dimensions: first, the
function characterizing the transition from the accommodative to the non-
accommodative state of monetary policy, then the measure of inflation used in
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estimating the Taylor rule. The first sensitivity analysis is important because
it captures how far apart the two states are, while the second is relevant for
determining the real interest rate, one of our transmission channels.
2.5.1 Model Parametrization: Smoothing Parameter
The smoothing parameter γ (see Equation 2.3) dictates the speed at which
monetary policy moves from the accommodative to the non-accommodative
state as z increases (e.g., moving from the negative to the positive territory)
is relevant for our empirical analysis. That speed is decreasing in γ, given
that F is an increasing function of γ. Table A2 in appendix displays output
multipliers across different values of γ, with government spending shocks
identified by forecast errors of federal spending. Our results are robust to
the frequency of monetary accommodation. Regardless of the value of γ,
GDP multipliers remain positive and larger under accommodative monetary
policy while fiscal stimulus are at times recessionary when monetary policy is
not accommodative. Note that, when γ increases, the difference in the size of
the multipliers between the accommodative and the non accommodative state
diminishes. Indeed, higher values of γ are associated with small deviations
of the interest rate from the target, inducing less expansionary fiscal stimuli.
2.5.2 Measure of Inflation Used in the Estimation of the
Taylor Rule
The measure of the inflation target used in the empirical analysis is poten-
tially relevant. We estimate different specifications of the Taylor rule using
respectively our benchmark measure of inflation (the one-quarter ahead fore-
cast of inflation from the SPF), the quarterly CPI inflation, the quarterly
Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) inflation, the year-on-year CPI
inflation, and the year-on-year lead CPI inflation. The latter is used as infla-
tion forecast. Our results (displayed in Table A1 in appendix) remain robust
across different measures of inflation. Whatever the specification, output
multipliers are larger under accommodative than non-accommodative mon-
etary policy.
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2.6 Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Pos-
sible Extensions
This paper examines how the stance of monetary policy affects the aggregate
and sectoral response of output to government spending shocks. We apply the
local projections method to quarterly U.S. data and provide estimates of the
government spending multiplier over the monetary policy cycle. Government
spending shocks are identified as forecast errors of the growth rate of federal
government spending from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the
Greenbook, further stripped from their predictable components. The state
of monetary policy is inferred from deviations of the Fed funds rate from the
target rate, using a smooth transition distribution, calibrated to reflect the
average frequency of monetary policy accommodation in Fed’s history.
We find that the federal government spending multiplier is substantially
higher under accommodative than under non-accommodative monetary pol-
icy. Moreover, by examining the response of various components of output,
including disaggregated consumption expenditure, we are able to reconcile,
within a unified framework, apparently contradictory findings in the existing
literature: federal government spending may crowd-in or crowd-out private
consumption, depending on the extent of monetary policy accommodation.
Controlling for predictable components of government spending increases the
estimated effectiveness of fiscal policy under accommodative monetary policy.
The paper documents two channels through which monetary policy accom-
modation increases the effectiveness of fiscal policy: the real interest rate
channel and the funding channel for federal government spending.
Our findings have important policy implications. They broadly suggest that
fiscal policy is more effective when needed the most (e.g., at times of slack),
if supported by monetary policy. Our results also have implications for the
normalization of monetary conditions in advanced economies: the exit from
UMP would lead to much lower federal government spending multipliers than
otherwise, even if some amount of slack was to remain in the economy. This
further highlights the need for a careful calibration of the timing of exit from
unconventional monetary policy.
Our analysis can be extended along several dimensions. First, a more ambi-
tious avenue to identifying the response of the monetary authority to macroe-
conomic developments, including fiscal policy, could be the narrative ap-
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proach based on historical record. This would consist in exploiting infor-
mation contained in the minutes of the meetings of the FOMC at the U.S.
Federal Reserve, available electronically on a quarterly basis since 1936. Mon-
etary policy could be deemed non-accommodative if the need to counter-act
the effects of government actions was explicitly mentioned in the minutes of
the FOMC meeting that took place around the time when the fiscal measure
was legislated or in anticipation to its adoption. Another natural extension
would be to apply the framework developed in this paper to examine the
effects of tax policy changes. The (traditional) associated challenge would
be the identification of exogenous variations in tax policy, given their distor-
sionary impact (e.g., on labor supply). Last, but not least, extending our
empirical framework to other OECD countries, and to Euro area countries in
particular (given their common central bank) would provide supplementary
evidence on how fiscal and monetary policy interact.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Policy and Income
Inequality: Evidence from Latin
American Countries
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3.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region has
experienced a significant decline in poverty and income inequality. Extreme
poverty, defined in the region as the proportion of the population living with
less than $2.50 Purchase Power Parity (PPP) a day, has declined by half in 15
years (from 26 percent in 1995 to less than 13 percent in 2010). The region has
also added 50 million people in the middle income class 1. However, despite
these impressive achievements in poverty reduction and increasing income
of the bottom segment, the region remains the most unequal in the world.
According to World Bank Group [2013], the largest segment of the region’s
population still remains vulnerable to falling back into poverty. In 2011, 40
percent of the population, while living with incomes above the poverty line
of $4 PPP a day, still remain below the middle class threshold of $10 PPP
a day. When comparing income inequality to other regions in the world,
with an average Gini coefficient of 0.52, the LAC region is 10.6 percent more
unequal than Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), 36.8 percent more unequal than
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and about 53 percent more unequal than
Europe and Central Asia (ECA)(see López and Perry [2008]).
Because high inequality can constitute a barrier to poverty reduction (see
López and Perry [2008]) or hinder economic growth by increasing political
instability, policy actions need to be taken to tackle these inequalities and
to foster the income growth of the population at the bottom of the social
pyramid. Since 2012, the international community led by the World Bank
Group (WBG) has set a new goal, achieving "shared prosperity". This goal
consists of promoting the income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the pop-
ulation in every country, to reduce rising inequality. The focus on improving
the income growth of the poorest 40 percent is a departure from traditional
approaches of reducing poverty that focus on GDP growth per capita. In
fact, while macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth per capita are
useful indicators of nations’ economic progress, they miss the distributional
aspects of the ensuing income. In this context, does fiscal policy contribute
(or not) to spur the income growth of the bottom 40 percent based on past
experience?
1. The proportion of people living with a daily per capita income between $10 and $50
PPP. This proportion of the population grew from 20 percent in 1995 to 30 percent in
2010.
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The question of how fiscal policy affect inequality in general and income of
the less well-off is relevant for a number of purposes. Temporary fiscal ex-
pansion can for instance stimulate low-skill employment, therefore increasing
the wage share of the low income groups, then reducing income inequality.
The composition of fiscal changes might also be relevant. For instance, a
fiscal adjustment relying more on progressive taxes (income taxes) will be
more likely to reduce income inequality 2 while regressive tax-based adjust-
ment like VAT may lower the disposal income of the low income classes and
increase inequality. Also, income inequality will tend to decrease with fiscal
expansion based on more progressive spending like public transfers.
The aim of this paper is therefore twofold: (i) examine how fiscal expan-
sion and fiscal contraction 3, including their composition, affect the income
growth of the bottom 40 percent in the LAC region; (ii) investigate how those
fiscal measures affect the two components associated to the income growth
of the bottom 40 percent, their income share growth (a measure of income
distribution) and the mean income growth captured in this study by the real
GDP growth.
I find that on average, expenditures-based fiscal expansion are more likely
to increase the income of the bottom 40 percent than revenues-based fiscal
expansion. This result is mainly driven by government current consumption,
transfers and subsidies. In addition, these fiscal expansion measures help
to reduce income inequality by improving the income share of the bottom
segments of the population while reducing the top income share. However,
fiscal expansion could either have no effect on economic growth or prevent
the latter through capital expenditures increases. Both expenditures and
revenues-based fiscal contraction are harmful for the income growth of the
bottom 40 percent and for income distribution. None of the fiscal contraction
measures affects significantly GDP growth.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow. Section 3.2 exposes the review
of the literature. Section 3.3 describes data and the identification strategy of
episodes of fiscal expansion and fiscal consolidation. Section 3.4 specifies the
econometric model and analyzes the estimation results. Section 3.5 presents
some robustness checks and discusses the results in relation with previous
2. One could however acknowledge that vertical equity can be addressed with targeted
tax credit.
3. I use alternatively fiscal adjustment or fiscal consolidation.
67
findings in the literature. Section 3.6 concludes, draws policy implications
and explores extensions.
3.2 Review of literature
Recent empirical studies on the distributional impact of fiscal policy has
mainly focused on advanced economies. Some of these papers examine the
effects of fiscal consolidation on income inequality. Mulas-Granados [2005]
find in a panel of 15 European member countries, that expenditures-based
fiscal adjustment is associated with an increase in income inequality, the
opposite holding true for revenue-based consolidation. In a panel of 18 in-
dustrialized, Agnello and Sousa [2012] find similar results. In addition, their
results suggest that the size of the fiscal adjustment as share of GDP is rel-
evant for income distribution. Indeed, a small size of fiscal adjustment was
associated with an income gap widening. Looking at the effects of fiscal con-
solidation on income inequality, wages and unemployment in a panel of 17
OECD countries, Ball et al. [2013] find that fiscal adjustment is associated
with raising inequality with larger distributional effects for spending-based
adjustment than tax-based adjustments. They also find that fiscal consoli-
dation decreases wage income shares and increases long-term unemployment.
Afonso et al. [2010] examine the relationship between public redistributive
spending (social spending, transfers and subsidies) and income distribution
in OECD countries with an emphasis on the role of educational achievement
and the quality of countries institutions. They find that public spending
when coupled with good educational achievement are associated with more
equal income distribution.
Other studies have undertaken a comparison of the distributional impact
of fiscal policy in developing countries versus advanced economies. Com-
paring market and disposal income Gini indexes, Bastagli et al. [2012] find
that in advanced economies, fiscal policy has played a significant role in re-
ducing inequalities mainly through expenditures-especially non-means-tested
transfers-. The authors explain the declined redistributive impact of fiscal
policy from the tax side by tax reforms introduced since mid-1990s that have
reduced the overall progressivity of the tax-benefit system. For developing
countries, they find that the redistributive impact of fiscal policy tends to be
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restricted due to lower levels of taxes and transfers. In addition, in-kind pub-
lic expenditures 4 have been found to be regressive, reflecting lack of access
of low-income classes to key public services.
Comparing the redistributive performance of Latin American and Western
European fiscal systems, Goni et al. [2011] find that the redistributive impact
of the fiscal system is very large in Europe and very small in Latin America.
In addition, in countries where fiscal redistribution is significant, it is achieved
mostly through transfers rather than taxes. Lustig et al. [2011] also find
that the redistributive impact of the fiscal system in LAC still remain little
compared to the Western Europe. However the size of the redistribution
has increased over time. In explaining the factors underlying the decline in
income inequality observed in many of Latin America countries during the
2000-10, Lustig et al. [2013] show that apart from the fall in the skilled labor
premium, more progressive government transfers primarily the introduction
of large-scale cash transfers targeted to the poor over the last fifteen years
has played a significant role.
This paper contributes to the existing literature along several dimensions.
First, most of the existing studies have primarily examined the distributional
impact of fiscal policy on OECD countries. Meanwhile, this paper focused
on the LAC region, one of the most unequal region in the world. Second, the
existing literature mainly focused on fiscal incidence on an aggregate measure
of income distribution, the Gini coefficient. However, the decline of the Gini
index does not provide information on how the income distribution changes
in favor of specific income classes like the bottom 40 percent. Last but not the
least, as robustness checks, not only this paper examine how fiscal expansion
and fiscal consolidation affect consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent,
it also investigates how those measures affect the Gini index and the top
income share growth. Given that changes in fiscal policy can potentially
be endogenous to income inequality, the sensitivity analysis also accounts
for that eventuality and results remain broadly unchanged compared to the
benchmark ones.
4. These expenditures refer to key public services such as education, health and housing.
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3.3 Data description and identification strat-
egy
I use the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (CAPD) to identify episodes
of fiscal expansion and fiscal consolidation. To adjust fiscal variables from
variations induced by the business cycle, I follow the methodology used by
Alesina and Perotti [1995], Alesina and Ardagna [2009] and Alesina and
Ardagna [2012]. This approach, very simple and transparent consists of cor-
recting components of the government budget from changes in unemployment
rate 5. Because I use fiscal variables expressed as variation from the previous
period, the cyclically adjusted value in the change of a fiscal variable in year
t is obtained as the difference between the measure of the fiscal variable in
period t computed as if the unemployment rate were equal to that of t−1 and
the actual measure of the fiscal variable in t − 1 when surveys are available
for two consecutive years. When the frequency of two consecutive surveys is
more than a year 6, the cyclically adjusted change in the budget component
is the average change between the cyclically adjusted budget component and
its value during the year where the previous survey took place 7.
3.3.1 Data description and sources
I use a panel of 18 Latin America countries during the period 1990-2010.
The study starts in 1990 because data on fiscal variables are not available
for most of the sample countries before 1990. Government spending and tax
revenues variables are expressed in percent of GDP. Spending components
include capital expenditures, government consumption (sum of : wages and
5. Note that there are other approaches of calculating cyclically-adjusted fiscal vari-
ables. For instance the IMF and the OECD use potential GDP and elasticities of fiscal
variables to output-gap to correct fiscal variables from cyclical variations. However, long
series of potential GDP and elasticities of budget variables to output-gap are not available
for most of the study countries.
6. Income of the bottom 40 percent is collected from households surveys. Because the
frequency of surveys is not regular, all the variables will be expressed in terms of average
change between two consecutive surveys.
7. The cyclically adjusted fiscal variable Ft(Ut−1) that is the fiscal variable in period
t as if the unemployment rate was equal to the one of t-1 is obtained by (i) estimating
for each country Ft = α0 + α1Trend + α2Ut + t (ii) and then recovered as Ft(Ut−1) =
αˆ0 + αˆ1Trend+ αˆ2Ut−1 + ˆt. The cyclically-adjusted change in the fiscal variable is then
Ft(Ut−1)− Ft−1 when surveys are available for two consecutive years.
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salaries, purchase of goods and services and other current expenditures) and
transfers and subsidies. Tax revenues components include direct tax rev-
enues, indirect tax revenues and social security contributions. The sample
of countries covers Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Repub-
lic of Venezuela (Venezuela, RB). Fiscal variables are from the ECLAC-
CEPALSTAT 8 database. Data on mean and income quintiles are from the
World BANK database PovcalNet. Table A7 in appendix provides informa-
tion on years where households surveys took place and from which data on
income are obtained.
Note that most household surveys included in the sample are nationally rep-
resentative with few exception with Argentina, where surveys cover only
urban population, which nonetheless represents more than 85 percent of the
total population in that country. Some surveys also cover only urban areas in
Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay for the early 90s, and Uruguay until 2005.
Individual income is before taxes and is constructed as the sum of labor
income (self-employed or salaried work) and non-labour income (includes:
pensions, capital income, public and private transfers and for some countries
imputed rents). The household income is constructed by adding incomes of
household members which are finally adjusted for several equivalence scales
to obtain household income per capita. The consumer price index is then
used to adjust nominal incomes in real incomes 9.
Other control variables and unemployment rate are taken from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) database.
3.3.2 Episodes of fiscal expansion and fiscal consolida-
tion
Episodes of fiscal expansion are identified as periods during which the change
in the CAPD is at least equal to 0.5 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, episodes
8. CEPALSTAT is the gateway to all the statistical information of Latin America and
the Caribbean countries collected, systematized and published by the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America and the Carribbean(ECLAC)
9. For more information on household surveys and definitions of income variables, visit
the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean(SEDLAC) website:
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/.
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of fiscal consolidation correspond to periods during which the change in the
CAPD is less than or equal to -0.5 percent of GDP 10. These thresholds
are reasonable given that most of the countries in the LAC region have low
tax performance and are constrained to borrow on international financial
markets. Also, choosing larger thresholds would have reduced the number
of identified episodes and make the analysis less robust. However, I proceed
to some sensitivity analysis around these thresholds and the results remain
broadly unchanged.
Using the above definitions, 73 cases of fiscal expansions and 67 cases of fis-
cal consolidations are selected. These episodes account respectively for 34.76
percent and 32 percent of total observations. Table A4 in appendix provides
detailed information for cases of fiscal expansions and fiscal consolidations
during years where household survey data were available. From this table,
one can mainly observe that: (i) most of the countries have typically im-
plemented loose fiscal policy during the 2008-2009 crisis except Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuala, RB; (ii) of the 67 periods of fiscal con-
solidations, 8 cases last for two consecutive years; (iii) Paraguay and El
Salvador have introduced adjustment plans lasting for 3 years (2002-2004)
for the former and 5 years (2002-2005) for the latter.
3.3.3 Composition of fiscal expansion and fiscal consol-
idation
3.3.3.1 Aggregate expenditures and tax revenues
Table 3.1 provides summary information for changes in the CAPD and its
main components, the primary expenditures and tax revenue-both cycli-
cally adjusted-during the whole sample period, episodes of fiscal expansion,
episodes of fiscal consolidation and during episodes of neutral fiscal policy 11.
10. Alesina and Perotti [1995], Alesina and Ardagna [2009] and Alesina and Ardagna
[2012] use 1.5 percent of GDP and -1.5 percent of GDP as thresholds to identity episodes
of large fiscal expansions and fiscal consolidations in the case of OECD countries. These
thresholds are reasonable for advanced economies as they have higher tax performance
and not constrained to borrow on financial markets.
11. Episodes of neutral fiscal policy are periods during which the change in the CAPD
relies between -0.5 and +0.5 percent of GDP. However, in the analysis, I don’t give em-
phasis to those episodes because the induced changes although cyclically adjusted could
be attributed to business cycle fluctuations.
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The table shows that, on average the CAPD during episodes of fiscal ex-
pansions increases by 1.46 percent of GDP while the corresponding decline
during episodes of fiscal consolidations is equal to 1.20 percent of GDP.
Does fiscal expansion typically occur on the spending side or on the tax
side? Is fiscal consolidation driven by spending cuts or tax increases? Figure
3.1 displays by how much each aggregate budget item contributes to the
change in the CAPD. It appears that fiscal expansion is typically a result of
expenditures increases than cuts in taxes. Indeed, the primary expenditures
contribute to roughly 91 percent to the increase in the CAPD during episodes
of fiscal expansions. Fiscal consolidation is typically a result of a policy
mix between spending cuts and tax increases. Of the -1.20 percent of GDP
reduction of the CAPD during episodes of fiscal consolidations, roughly 55
percent represents cuts in expenditures and the rest represents the increase
in tax revenues.
Table 3.1 – Average changes in percent of GDP of the CAPD and its main
components
FISCAL Nobs PRIM. PRIM. TAX
IMPULSES DEFICIT EXPENSES REVENUES
ALL 210 0.12 0.35 0.22
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
EXPANSIONS 73 1.46 1.33 -0.13
(0.11) (0.14) (0.09)
CONSOLIDATIONS 67 -1.20 -0.66 0.52
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
NEUTRAL 70 -0.02 0.29 0.31
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Notes: This table displays the average changes in the CAPD and its two main components for the
sample-period and during episodes of fiscal expansions, fiscal consolidations and neutral fiscal policy.
3.3.3.2 Disaggregate expenditures and tax revenues
Detailed information about changes in more disaggregate expenditures and
tax revenues items during episodes of fiscal expansion and fiscal consolidation
is provided in Table A5 and Table A6 in the appendix. Meanwhile, Figure
3.2 displays the contribution of the budget components to the change in the
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Figure 3.1 – Contributions of primary expenses and tax revenues to changes in
the CAPD
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Notes: The chart portrays contributions of cyclically adjusted primary expenditures and tax rev-
enues to the change in the CAPD.
CAPD. Accordingly, during episodes of fiscal expansion, the 91 percent con-
tribution of the average increase in the primary expenditures are distributed
as following: 24 percent from government current consumption, 31 percent
from capital expenditures and 36 percent from transfers and subsidies. Dur-
ing episodes of fiscal consolidation, spending cuts as share of GDP is almost
the same amount among the three expenditures with a slightly larger drop
in current consumption. In the tax side, fiscal consolation is typically driven
by an equivalent rise in direct and in indirect taxes as share of GDP.
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Figure 3.2 – Contributions of expenditures and tax revenues components to the
change in the CAPD
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3.4 Econometric specification and results anal-
ysis
3.4.1 Econometric model
The following panel econometric model is estimated to explore the empiri-
cal relationship between my variables of interest and fiscal variables during
episodes of fiscal expansion or during episodes of fiscal consolidation:
∆yi,t = αi+β1(∆CAPD×D)i,t−1 +β(∆CAPD×D)i,t+∆X ′i,tΦ+ i,t (3.1)
where ∆yt is the growth rate of each variable of interest. Di,t is a dummy vari-
able taking value of 1 during episodes of fiscal expansion or during episodes
of fiscal consolidation; αi is the country fixed effect, Xi,t is a vector of con-
trol variables that have been found likely to affect variables of interest. β1
captures the lagged effect of adopted fiscal measures while β captures the
contemporaneous effect.
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To account for the composition of fiscal expansion and fiscal consolidation,
I extend the benchmark Equation 3.1 replacing the CAPD by its compo-
nents: the primary expenditures and tax revenues. I also decompose each of
the previous component to its main items, that is government consumption,
capital expenditures, transfers and subsidies for primary expenditures; direct
taxes, indirect taxes and SSC for tax revenues.
3.4.2 Results for fiscal expansion
3.4.2.1 Effects of fiscal expansion on the income of the bottom 40
percent
Table 3.2 reports the effects on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent of
alternative measures of fiscal policy during episodes of fiscal expansion. These
episodes are identified as periods during which the change in the cyclically-
adjusted primary deficit is a least equal to 0.5 percent of GDP.
The first row shows the contemporaneous effect of an increase in the CAPD
of 1 percentage point of GDP. Specifications (3) to (8) include control vari-
ables likely to affect the income growth of the poor. These controls are
respectively a measure of: financial development(real growth of M2), agri-
cultural development(real growth of agricultural value added), trade liberal-
ization(real export growth) and the U.S. GDP growth. The latter variable
may capture the effect of remittances inflows from Latin American immi-
grants leaving in the U.S. as remittances outflows in the U.S. tend to be
synchronized with the U.S. business cycle. Estimates suggest that, on aver-
age, fiscal expansion induces a rise of the income growth of the bottom 40
percent of about 2.5 percentage points 12. This result remain unchanged with
or without the inclusion of control variables. Among control variables, agri-
cultural development affect significantly the income of the poor. The impact
of financial development and the state of the U.S. economy is positive but
non-significant. In column (2) fiscal expansion seems not to have a significant
lagged effect on the income growth of the poor.
Columns (9) to (11) account for the composition of fiscal expansion. In
these specifications, lagged fiscal variables are not included in the RHS of
12. I obtain the same results on the income growth of the bottom 20 percent with a
more pronounced impact of about 4 percentage point increase.
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the estimated equation 13. Results in column (9) suggest that expenditures-
based fiscal expansion are more likely to stimulate the income of the bottom
40 percent while tax revenues-based stimulus tend to not have a significant
impact. In specification (10) primary expenditures are decomposed in terms
of its main items. The findings show that government current consumption
and transfers and subsidies are the expenditures items stimulating the income
of the bottom 40 percent, a result that does not hold for capital expenditures.
The decomposition of aggregate tax revenue show that reducing direct taxes
affect positively the income of the poor.
3.4.2.2 Effects of fiscal expansion on GDP growth and on income
inequality
The mean income growth of the less well-off can mechanically be expressed
as the sum of the growth rate of the share income accruing to the less well-off
and the growth rate of the average income as following:
dlnY Pt
dt
≈ dlnS
P
t
dt
+
dlnYt
dt
Where Y Pt is the average income of the bottom 40 percent, S
P
t their income
share and Yt, the average income. In the following, I examine how fiscal
expansion affect these two components.
Table 3.3 reports the effects on real GDP growth per capita considered as
a measure of the mean income growth 14. The main control variables are
those usually used in the empirical growth and development literature, that is
financial development (growth rate of M2), homicides growth rate, a measure
of human capital (gross primary school enrollment growth). I also control for
the state of the U.S. business cycle. Estimates suggest that fiscal expansion
does not have a significant effect on GDP growth. This results holds for
both spending increases and tax-cuts at the aggregate level. Surprisingly,
increasing capital expenditures tends to hinder economic growth. This result
is consistent with Alesina and Ardagna [2009] finding and could be due to the
fact that high public investment is sometime associated with high corruption.
As consequences some public investment can end up reducing growth because
the productivity of that investment has declined.
13. Their impacts are not significant
14. I also use the mean income growth from households surveys data. Results, not
reported here remain consistent with those where GDP growth per capita is used.
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Table 3.2 – Effects of fiscal fiscal expansion on the income growth of the bottom
40 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPD 0.026∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Lag ∆CAPD -0.013
(0.008)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.117 0.178 0.172 0.169 0.193
(0.085) (0.106) (0.108) (0.120) (0.114)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.349∗ 0.355∗∗ 0.366∗ 0.332∗ 0.456∗∗
(0.170) (0.160) (0.175) (0.160) (0.189)
∆ln(GDP deflator) 0.044 -0.258 -0.249 -0.253 -0.360∗
(0.222) (0.191) (0.190) (0.201) (0.182)
∆ln(Real Export) 0.027 -0.025 -0.021 -0.069 -0.053
(0.105) (0.112) (0.113) (0.145) (0.126)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 0.598 0.497 0.541 0.561 0.714
(1.287) (1.284) (1.288) (1.412) (1.387)
∆Prim. expend. 0.030∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
∆Tax revenues -0.017 -0.021
(0.027) (0.027)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.090∗∗∗
(0.027)
∆Capital expend. -0.004
(0.024)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.023∗∗
(0.009)
∆Direct taxes -0.064∗
(0.031)
∆Indirect taxes 0.034
(0.026)
∆SSC 0.027
(0.028)
Constant 0.136 0.104∗∗∗ 0.086 0.115 0.126 0.136 0.136 0.096 0.096 -0.197∗∗∗ 0.115
(0.219) (0.028) (0.211) (0.218) (0.214) (0.221) (0.220) (0.215) (0.215) (0.051) (0.225)
No.Obs 210 190 210 208 210 209 210 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal expansion on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent. All fiscal variables are
expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-added, export, U.S.
GDP and inflation rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Among control variables, results suggest that inflation and homicides are
detrimental to economic growth. It is worth nothing that while an improve-
ment of the U.S. economy does not necessarily increase significantly the in-
come of the poor in LAC, but it significantly affects the aggregate economic
growth.
Table 3.4 shows the impact of fiscal expansion on the income share growth
of the bottom 40 percent. I use almost the same control variables as in the
case of the income growth of the bottom 40 percent except for inflation rate
and U.S. GDP growth. However, I control for countries real GDP growth to
look at how much inclusive is economic growth in LAC. In general, results
look very similar to those in Table 3.2. A percentage point GDP increase
in the primary deficit increases the income share growth of the bottom 40
percent by 2 percentage points. Also, the composition of fiscal expansion
affect the income share growth primarily through consumption expenditures
and transfers and subsidies. Tax reductions including their composition do
not have a significant impact on the income share growth of the bottom 40
percent. Results in column (7) suggest that economic growth also tends to
improve the income share of the poor.
The improvement of the income share of the bottom 40 percent by govern-
ment current consumption could be driven by the fact that new job creation,
including in the private sector, might mostly be low-skill. In fact, firms may
not expand high-skill employment to meet extra short-term demand brought
about by a temporary fiscal stimulus. In fact, high-skill business processes
are already in places and firms may just need more people to produce more in
the short-term. For transfers, since the latter are progressive, their increase
should induce a rise of the income share of the less well-off.
3.4.3 Results for fiscal consolidation
3.4.3.1 Effects of fiscal consolidation on the income of the bottom
40 percent
To investigate how fiscal contraction affect variables of interest, the base-
line Equation 3.1 is estimated during episodes of fiscal consolidation. The
latter episodes are identified as periods during which the cyclically-adjusted
primary deficit declines at least by 0.5 percent of GDP (or the cyclically ad-
justed primary balance (CAPB) improves by at least 0.5 percent of GDP).
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Table 3.3 – Effects of fiscal expansion on GDP growth per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPD -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Lag ∆CAPD 0.000
(0.003)
∆ln(homicides) -0.070∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.069∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026)
∆ln(GDP deflator) -0.039 -0.134∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.136∗ -0.138∗∗
(0.051) (0.061) (0.067) (0.065) (0.063)
∆ln(School enrol.) 0.132 0.106 0.079 0.085 0.088
(0.104) (0.108) (0.120) (0.119) (0.116)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.013 0.032 0.035 0.034 0.034
(0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 1.385∗∗ 1.800∗∗ 1.806∗∗ 1.808∗∗ 1.807∗∗
(0.552) (0.756) (0.754) (0.755) (0.780)
∆Prim. expend. -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
∆Tax revenues -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.001
(0.010)
∆Capital expend. -0.015∗∗
(0.006)
∆Transfert & subs -0.004
(0.003)
∆Direct taxes -0.007
(0.020)
∆Indirect taxes 0.005
(0.012)
∆SSC -0.001
(0.011)
Constant 0.004 0.046∗∗∗ 0.009 0.013 0.007 -0.001 0.006 -0.075∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.076∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
No.Obs 210 190 149 210 172 210 210 128 128 128 128
No.countries 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 17 17 17 17
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal expansion on GDP growth per capita. All fiscal variables are expressed as share
of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include growth rate of: homicides, M2, gross primary school enrollment, export,
inflation rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.4 – Effects of fiscal expansion on the income share growth of the bottom
40 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆CAPD 0.021∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Lag ∆CAPD 0.002
(0.006)
∆ln(RGDP ) 0.248 0.333∗ 0.314 0.276 0.288
(0.171) (0.188) (0.182) (0.199) (0.204)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.102 0.091 0.085 0.087 0.083
(0.079) (0.075) (0.075) (0.085) (0.078)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.053 0.068 0.085 0.080 0.133
(0.089) (0.091) (0.100) (0.099) (0.115)
∆ln(Real Export) -0.106 -0.165 -0.154 -0.131 -0.164
(0.098) (0.103) (0.101) (0.108) (0.104)
∆Prim. expend. 0.023∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
∆Tax revenues -0.004 -0.002
(0.019) (0.021)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.065∗∗
(0.024)
∆Capital expend. 0.004
(0.018)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.019∗
(0.010)
∆Direct taxes -0.031
(0.022)
∆Indirect taxes 0.023
(0.022)
∆SSC 0.007
(0.029)
Constant 0.105 0.025 0.104 0.062 0.103 0.108 0.065 0.066 -0.082∗ 0.068
(0.113) (0.015) (0.112) (0.104) (0.114) (0.114) (0.100) (0.101) (0.039) (0.103)
No.Obs 210 190 210 210 208 209 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table reports the effects of fiscal expansion on the income share growth of the bottom 40 percent. All fiscal
variables are expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: GDP, M2, agriculture
value-added, export, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 3.5 reports the effects of different measures of fiscal consolidation on
the income growth of the bottom 40 percent. The first row points out the
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impact of an improvement of the CAPB of 1 percentage point GDP. Results
in column (8) suggest that fiscal consolidation may to some extent impede
the income growth of the less well-off. The effects of the composition of fiscal
contraction are displayed in columns (9)-(11). Accordingly, expenditures-
based fiscal contraction are more likely to hinder the income growth of the
bottom segment of the income distribution than tax-based consolidation.
Disaggregating primary expenditures and total revenues doesn’t conduct to
significant impact.
3.4.3.2 Effects of fiscal consolidation on GDP growth and on in-
come inequality
What is the impact of fiscal contraction on the average income and on the
income share of the bottom 40 percent? Table 3.6 portrays the effect of fiscal
consolidation on GDP growth per capita. It emerges from the table that
reducing the primary deficit does not necessarily impede economic growth
as the impact in all the specification is not significant. In the same vein,
the composition of fiscal consolidation from the spending side or from the
revenue side does not prevent economic growth.
Table 3.7 shows the effects of fiscal consolidation on the growth rate of the
income share accruing to the bottom 40 percent. Results indicate that reduc-
ing the primary deficit does not impact the income share of the less well-off.
However, the composition of fiscal consolidation indicates a decline of the
income share of the bottom 40 percent due to an increase in taxes, primarily
indirect taxes.
82
Table 3.5 – Effects of fiscal contraction on the income growth of the bottom 40
percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPB -0.017 -0.022 -0.019 -0.022 -0.017 -0.020 -0.017 -0.025∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Lag ∆CAPB 0.007
(0.010)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.119 0.185 0.180 0.171 0.208
(0.092) (0.111) (0.112) (0.122) (0.124)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.301∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.362∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.394∗∗
(0.152) (0.143) (0.150) (0.138) (0.148)
∆ln(GDP deflator) 0.029 -0.285 -0.263 -0.295 -0.320
(0.243) (0.198) (0.209) (0.242) (0.209)
∆ln(Real Export) -0.038 -0.097 -0.095 -0.135 -0.131
(0.107) (0.117) (0.121) (0.152) (0.150)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 0.671 0.751 0.794 0.816 1.250
(1.212) (1.166) (1.189) (1.210) (1.362)
∆Prim. expend. 0.032∗ 0.037∗
(0.016) (0.018)
∆Tax revenues -0.014 -0.010
(0.014) (0.014)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.029
(0.043)
∆Capital expend. 0.023
(0.016)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.020
(0.027)
∆Direct taxes 0.009
(0.024)
∆Indirect taxes -0.040
(0.028)
∆SSC 0.007
(0.049)
Constant 0.184 0.112∗∗ 0.138 0.179 0.178 0.194 0.184 0.172 0.172 -0.136∗∗ 0.195
(0.231) (0.044) (0.222) (0.231) (0.223) (0.235) (0.232) (0.229) (0.233) (0.052) (0.242)
No.Obs 210 190 210 208 210 209 210 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal consolidation on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent. All fiscal variables
are expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-added, export,
U.S. GDP and inflation rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are
reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.6 – Effects of fiscal contraction on GDP growth per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPB -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Lag ∆CAPB 0.002
(0.004)
∆ln(homicides) -0.069∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026)
∆ln(GDP deflator) -0.038 -0.122∗ -0.120∗ -0.177∗∗ -0.125∗
(0.051) (0.059) (0.060) (0.082) (0.066)
∆ln(School enrol.) 0.139 0.128 0.132 0.217∗ 0.180
(0.105) (0.101) (0.102) (0.123) (0.117)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.014 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.034
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 1.371∗∗ 1.827∗∗ 1.845∗∗ 1.950∗∗ 1.721∗
(0.551) (0.790) (0.776) (0.772) (0.815)
∆Prim. expend. -0.005 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010)
∆Tax revenues 0.007 0.006
(0.007) (0.005)
∆Gov. Consump. -0.028
(0.028)
∆Capital expend. -0.002
(0.007)
∆Transfert & subs 0.006
(0.010)
∆Direct taxes -0.006
(0.009)
∆Indirect taxes 0.015
(0.016)
∆SSC 0.033
(0.020)
Constant 0.012 0.040∗∗ 0.008 0.020 0.009 0.007 0.012 -0.088∗∗ -0.090∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.095∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
No.Obs 210 190 149 210 172 210 210 128 128 128 128
No.countries 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 17 17 17 17
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal consolidation on GDP growth per capita. All fiscal variables are expressed as share
of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include growth rate of: homicides, M2, gross primary school enrollment, export,
inflation rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.7 – Effects of fiscal contraction on the income share growth of the bottom
40 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆CAPB -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Lag ∆CAPB -0.003
(0.005)
∆ln(RGDP ) 0.243 0.372∗ 0.443∗∗ 0.388∗∗ 0.468∗∗
(0.169) (0.179) (0.169) (0.175) (0.188)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.102 0.090 0.088 0.082 0.089
(0.085) (0.081) (0.079) (0.083) (0.078)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.001 0.030 -0.003 0.001 0.004
(0.091) (0.096) (0.093) (0.107) (0.094)
∆ln(Real Export) -0.143 -0.202∗ -0.221∗∗ -0.212∗ -0.233∗
(0.106) (0.111) (0.100) (0.106) (0.116)
∆Prim. expend. -0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.009)
∆Tax revenues -0.023∗ -0.012
(0.013) (0.010)
∆Gov. Consump. -0.000
(0.016)
∆Capital expend. -0.013
(0.022)
∆Transfert & subs. -0.004
(0.011)
∆Direct taxes -0.010
(0.015)
∆Indirect taxes -0.036∗
(0.017)
∆SSC -0.046
(0.029)
Constant 0.110 0.061∗∗∗ 0.107 0.070 0.115 0.125 0.088 0.085 -0.070 0.099
(0.122) (0.014) (0.121) (0.113) (0.122) (0.128) (0.114) (0.111) (0.042) (0.116)
No.Obs 210 190 210 210 208 209 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table reports the effects of fiscal consolidation on the income share growth of the bottom 40 percent. All fiscal variables
are expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: GDP, M2, agriculture value-added,
export, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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3.5 Sensitivity analysis and discussion
The sensivity analysis is articulated around the following points: (i) changing
the threshold to identify episode of fiscal expansion and fiscal contraction; (ii)
using consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent as measure of welfare
instead of their income growth; (iii) examining the effects of fiscal expan-
sion/consolidation on an aggregate measure of income inequality, the Gini
index, and on the top income share; (iv) examining the effects of fiscal expan-
sion/consolidation on variables of interest when fiscal variables are corrected
for potential endogeneity.
3.5.1 Changing the threshold for identification of fiscal
measures
Increasing the threshold for identification of episodes of fiscal expansion and
fiscal consolidation is important to assess if the size of the stimulus or ad-
justment is relevant for the income growth of the poor. In this vein, episodes
of fiscal expansion (consolidation) are identified as periods during the change
in the CAPD is at least equal to 1 percent (-1 percent) of GDP. With these
thresholds, 45 periods, roughly 21 percent of the sample are identified as
episodes of fiscal expansion while 30 periods (14 percent of the sample) are
identified as episodes of fiscal consolidation. During episodes of fiscal expan-
sion, on average the CAPD increases by 1.90 percent of GDP with primary
expenditure contributing up to 1.64 percent of GDP and tax-cut of 0.26 per-
cent of GDP. During episodes of fiscal contraction, the CAPD declines on
average by 1.70 percent of GDP. On average, cuts in primary expenditure are
equal to 1.27 percent of GDP while tax revenues increase on average by 0.42
percent of GDP. When comparing to the baseline case, it should be noted
that with the new thresholds, fiscal consolidation is mainly driven by cuts in
primary expenditures; while in the baseline, fiscal consolidation was a mix of
expenditures increases and tax-cuts of almost the same importance.
How the income growth of the bottom 40 percent responds to these changes?
Table A8 and Table A9 in appendix report respectively the impact of fiscal
expansion and fiscal consolidation on the income growth of the bottom 40
percent. For fiscal expansion, results remain broadly similar to the base-
line scenario where the income growth of the bottom 40 percent increases
by 2 percentage points when the primary deficit increases by 1 percent of
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GDP. Results for the composition of fiscal expansion also remain broadly
unchanged. These findings suggest that the size of fiscal expansion seems
to not be relevant to increase the income of the poor. None of the fiscal
consolidation measure affect significantly the income growth of the bottom
40 percent. This result is somewhat different from the baseline scenario
where expenditures-based consolidation were associated with the decline of
the income of the less well-off 15.
3.5.2 Consumption of the bottom 40 percent and fiscal
expansion/adjustment
Are the bottom 40 percent ricardians or rule-of-thumb consumers? One
might expect this segment of the population consuming their current income
as they are financially constraints. In the baseline scenario, the findings
show that during episode of fiscal expansion, an increase of the CAPD of 1
percent of GDP improves the income growth of the bottom 40 percent by 2
percentage points while the effect of an improvement of the primary deficit
could to some extent reduce their income. How these changes in the primary
deficit affect consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent?
Results in Table A10 in appendix suggest that fiscal expansion leads to more
consumption for the bottom 40 percent. Consumption growth increases by
2 percentage points as the CAPD increases by 1 percent of GDP. This re-
sults tend to confirm the non-ricardian prediction of the bottom 40 percent
as fiscal expansion also increase their income growth by 2 percentage points.
Expenditures-based fiscal expansion are also more likely to increase con-
sumption of the poor than those based in tax-cuts. When looking at the
composition of primary expenditures, government current consumption is
the main expenditures item stimulating consumption of the poor. Although
the effect of tax-cuts is non significant at the aggregate level, reducing direct
taxes tends to stimulate consumption of the poor. Fiscal consolidation seems
to not have a significant impact on consumption growth of the bottom 40
percent (see Table A11 in appendix). This result is almost consistent with
the effects of fiscal consolidation on the income growth of the bottom 40
percent with few exceptions.
15. Compared to the baseline scenario, results not shown here for the effects of fiscal
expansions/adjustment on GDP growth and income distribution remain unchanged.
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3.5.3 Gini index and fiscal expansion/adjustment
The Gini index and the income share of the bottom segment might evolve in
opposite direction. Indeed, if the income share of the lower segment increases,
this reduces income disparities and lower the Gini index. Below, I investigate
how fiscal expansion and fiscal consolidation affect the Gini coefficient.
Table A12 in appendix reports the effects of fiscal expansion on the growth
rate of the market income Gini coefficient. Consistent with the effects of
fiscal expansion on the income share of the bottom 40 percent, fiscal expan-
sion reduces the overall income inequality. On average, an increase of the
cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of 1 percentage point of GDP induces a
decline of the Gini index growth rate of 1 percentage point. When looking at
the composition of fiscal expansion, expenditures-based fiscal expansion are
more likely to reduce income inequality primarily through current consump-
tion, transfers and subsidies. There is also an evidence that cutting direct
taxes is likely to reduce income inequality. The effects of fiscal consolidation
(see Table A13 in appendix) remain broadly non significant with a small ex-
ception for indirect taxes that tend to increase income inequality. The latter
finding is in line with the effects of indirect taxes-based fiscal adjustment on
the income share of the bottom 40 percent.
3.5.4 What happens for the top income?
The above results showed that expenditures-based fiscal expansion increase
the income share of the bottom 40 percent and induce a decline of the
Gini index. We might therefore expect the top income share declining with
expenditures-based fiscal expansion. Table 3.8 provides estimates of the im-
pact of fiscal expansion on the income share growth of the top 40 percent.
Consistent with the above findings, expenditures-based fiscal expansion, pri-
marily government current consumption, transfers and subsidies are more
likely to reduce the income share of the top 40 percent. I also perform the
same exercise on the income share growth of the top 20 percent and top 10
percent. Results, not reported here remain consistent with those associated
to the top 40 percent 16.
16. The effects of fiscal consolidation of the top income share are non significants. Results
remain available upon request.
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Table 3.8 – Effects of fiscal expansion on the income share growth of the top 40
percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆CAPD -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Lag ∆CAPD -0.002∗∗
(0.001)
∆Prim. expend. -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
∆Tax revenues 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
∆Gov. Consump. -0.010∗∗
(0.004)
∆Capital expend. 0.000
(0.002)
∆Transfert & subs. -0.006∗
(0.003)
∆Direct taxes 0.004
(0.004)
∆Indirect taxes -0.001
(0.003)
∆SSC 0.000
(0.005)
Constant -0.021 -0.002 -0.021 0.008∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.022) (0.005) (0.022) (0.000) (0.022)
No.Obs 205 187 205 194 203
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table reports the effects of fiscal expansion on the income share growth of the top 40 percent. All fiscal
variables are expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Regressions include countries and years fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
3.5.5 Correcting fiscal variables from potential endo-
geneity
It is likely that fiscal policy responds endogenously to the level of income
inequality. Not considering this eventuality could bias our results. To ac-
count for that possibility, I correct cyclically-adjusted budget variables from
changes in the level of income inequality using the Gini index. This con-
sists of estimating what cyclically-adjusted government outlays and revenues
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would be in any given year if the Gini index had remain the same as in the
previous survey. The cyclically adjusted value in the change of a fiscal vari-
able in year t correcting for possible endogeneity is obtained as the difference
between the cyclically-adjusted fiscal variable in period t computed as if the
Gini index were equal to that of the previous survey and the actual measure
of the fiscal variable at the year of the previous survey 17.
Table A14 in the Appendix portrays the impact of fiscal expansion (columns
1-4) and the impact of fiscal contraction (columns 5-8) on the income growth
of the bottom 40 percent. Results remain broadly unchanged (see Tables
Table 3.2 and 3.5). Expenditures-based fiscal expansion (through government
current consumption and transfers and subsidies) are more likely to stimulate
the income of the bottom 40 percent. The positive impact of direct taxes
reduction on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent is now slightly
higher. For fiscal contraction, the negative impact of primary expenditures
reduction and tax revenues increase is now more pronounced.
For the income share growth of the bottom 40 percent, results in Table
A15 remain broadly unaltered for the impact of fiscal expansion(columns
1-4) compared to the benchmark ones (see Table 3.4). Results for fiscal
consolidation(columns 5-8) are slightly different. Expenditures and revenues
based-consolidation are both harmful for the income share growth of the
bottom 40 percent, increasing therefore income inequality 18.
3.5.6 Discussion
This paragraph discusses the results in relation with previous in the litera-
ture. In this study, expenditures-based fiscal expansion tend to reduce income
inequality meanwhile expenditures-based fiscal consolidation exacerbate in-
come inequality. These findings are consistent with previous findings in the
literature (see Mulas-Granados [2005] Agnello and Sousa [2012] Bastagli et al.
17. In fact, I follow the same approach of correcting fiscal variables from variations
induced by the business cycle (see Section 3.3). Instead of regressing each cyclically-
adjusted fiscal variable on the Gini index country by country, I use a panel regression
because some countries have limited data on the Gini index
18. I also performed the same exercise using the Gini index growth rate and results not
reported show that both expenditures and revenues (including all the 3 revenues items)
based-consolidation increase overall income inequality
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[2012] Lustig et al. [2013]). However, results for tax-based fiscal consolida-
tion in this study are somewhat in contrast with previous findings. In the
literature, previous studies on OECD countries generally find that tax-based
fiscal consolidation tend to reduce income inequality meanwhile I find rising
inequality sometime associated with tax-based fiscal consolidation. A pos-
sible explanation could be related to the fact that in advanced economies,
the tax system is quite progressive which is not often the case in developing
countries. But this explanation should be taken with caution, given that the
income distribution variables in this study are not net of taxes.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the effects of fiscal expansion, fiscal consolida-
tion and their compositions on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent,
on income inequality and on economic growth using a panel of 18 countries
in the Latin America region. Fiscal expansion and fiscal consolidation are
identified by periods for which there is a significant change in the cyclically-
adjusted primary deficit as share of GDP.
The findings of the paper can be summarized as following: on average in Latin
American countries, expenditures-based fiscal expansion are more likely to
increase the income of the bottom 40 percent than revenues-based fiscal ex-
pansion. This result is mainly driven by government current consumption,
transfers and subsidies. In addition, these fiscal expansion measures help
to reduce income inequality by improving the income share of the bottom
segments of the population while reducing the top income share. However,
fiscal expansion could either have no effect on economic growth or prevent
the latter through capital expenditures increases. Results for fiscal consol-
idation are somewhat mixed. Sometime, fiscal consolidation is associated
with a decline of the income growth of the less well-off and rising inequal-
ity, sometime the impact is non-significant. Further investigation is needed
to draw general conclusions. None of the fiscal contraction measures affects
significantly GDP growth.
The findings of this paper have some policy implications: expenditures-based
fiscal expansion affect the income growth of the less-well primarily through re-
duced inequality by improving their income share. Countries with some fiscal
space could initiate or continue to implement safety nets program –like con-
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ditional cash transfer programs–necessary to prevent the vulnerable segment
of the population to adverse shocks and to improve their living standards.
With a potential of stimulating low-skill employment, a wise fiscal stimulus
through government current consumption increases could also play a signif-
icant role to reduce inequality. Finally, to avoid capital expenditures that
hinder economic growth, efficient public investment projects should be priori-
tized in the policy making process. This consists of implementing investment
projects with higher productivity that can enhance economic growth neces-
sary to reduce inequality.
This analysis can be extended along several dimensions. A more ambitious
avenue to identifying episodes of fiscal expansion and fiscal consolidation is
the narrative approach that consists of exploiting the information contained
in budget acts. This might help comparing the results of this study from those
obtained using the narrative approach. Another natural extension would be
to apply the framework developed in this paper to other regions and to try
to understand the potential differences that may emerge across regions.
Bibliography
António Afonso, Ludger Schuknecht, and Vito Tanzi. Income distribution de-
terminants and public spending efficiency. Journal of Economic Inequality,
8(3):367–389, September 2010.
Luca Agnello and Ricardo M. Sousa. How does fiscal consolidation impact
on income inequality? The Review of Income and Wealth, December 2012.
Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi. Fiscal Policy After the Financial
Crisis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013.
Alberto F. Alesina and Silvia Ardagna. Large changes in fiscal policy: Taxes
versus spending. Octobre 2009.
Alberto F. Alesina and Silvia Ardagna. The design of fiscal adjustments.
NBER Working Papers No 18423, September 2012.
Alberto F. Alesina and Roberto Perotti. Fiscal expansions and fiscal adjust-
ments in oecd countries. NBER Working Paper No 5214, August 1995.
Derek Anderson, Benjamin Hunt, Mika Kortelainen, Michael Kumhof, Dou-
glas Laxton, Dirk Muir, Susanna Mursula, and Stephen Snudden. Getting
to know gimf: The simulation properties of the global integrated monetary
and fiscal model. IMF Working Paper No. 13/55, February 2013.
Alan J. Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. Measuring the output responses
to fiscal policy. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2):1–27,
2012.
Alan J. Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. Fiscal multipliers in recession
and expansion. in Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, University of
Chicago Press, 2013.
92
93
Luc Ball, Davide Furceri, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash Loungani. The distri-
butional effects of fiscal consolidation. IMF Working Paper, June 2013.
Robert J. Barro and Charles J. Redlick. Macroeconomic effects from gov-
ernment purchases and taxes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1):
51–102, 2011.
Francesca Bastagli, David Coady, and Sanjeev Gupta. Income inequality and
fiscal policy. IMF Staff Discussion Note, September 2012.
Anja Baum, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Anke Weber. Fiscal multipliers
and the state of the economy. International Monetary Fund, (WP 12/286),
12 2012.
Vincent Tsoungui Belinga. Effects of fiscal policy shocks on a small open econ-
omy: Evidence from canada. Université de Montréal, Canada, (Mimeo),
2013.
Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti. An empirical characterization of the
dynamic effects of changes in government spending and taxes on output.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4):1329–1368, nov 2002.
Benjamin Born, Falko Juessen, and Gernot Johannes Müller. Exchange rate
regimes and fiscal multipliers. CEPR Discussion Papers 8986, C.E.P.R.
Discussion Papers, 2012.
Hafedh Bouakez and Nooman Rebei. Why does private consumption rise
after a government spending shock? Canadian Journal of Economics, 40
(3):954–979, aug 2007.
Fabio Canova and Evi Pappa. Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and monetary
accommodation. Economic Policy, pages 555–598, 10 2011.
Woon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux. Asymmetric effects of government
spending: Does the level of real interest rates matter? IMF Staff Papers,
53:Special Issue, 2006. URL http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:
imfstp:v::y:2006:i:si:p:8.
Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. When is the
government spending multiplier large? Journal of Political Economy, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 119(1):78–121, 2011.
94
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Mathias Trabandt. Un-
derstanding the great recession. Mimeo, August 2014.
Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler. Monetary policy rules in
practice some international evidence. European Economic Review, 42(6):
1033–1067, June 1998.
Günter Coenen, Christopher Erceg, Charles Freedman, Davide Furceri,
Michael Kumhof, René Lalonde, Douglas Laxton, Jesper Lindé, Annabelle
Mourougane, Dirk Muir, Susanna Mursula, Carlos de Resende, John
Roberts, Werner Roeger, Stephen Snudden, Mathias Trabandt, and Jan
in ’t Veld. Effects of fiscal stimulus in structural models. IMF Working
Paper 10/73, March 2010.
Giancarlo Corsetti and Gernot J. Müller. Twin deficits: Squaring theory,
evidence and common sense. Economic Policy, 21(48):597–638, October
2006.
Troy Davig and Eric M. Leeper. Fluctuating macro policies and the fiscal
theory. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006, 21:247–316, 2007.
Troy Davig and Eric M. Leeper. Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and fiscal
stimulus. European Economic Review, 55(2):211–227, February 2011. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v55y2011i2p211-227.html.
Luca Dedola and Stefano Neri. What does a technology shock do? a var anal-
ysis with model-based sign restrictions. Journal of Monetary Economics,
54(2):512–549, mar 2007.
Zeno Enders, Gernot J. Müller, and Almuth Scholl. How do fiscal and tech-
nology shocks affect real exchange rates?: New evidence for the united
states. Journal of International Economics, 83(1):53–69, jan 2011.
Charles Freedman, Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton, Dirk Muir, and Su-
sanna Mursula. Global effects of fiscal stimulus during the crisis. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 2010.
Vitor Gaspar. Examples of monetary-fiscal interaction at the zero lower
bound. Lecture, MIT Sloan School of Managment, March 2015.
95
Edwin Goni, Humberto J. López, and Luis Servén. Fiscal redistribution and
income inequality in latin america. World Development, 39(9):1558–1569,
September 2011.
James Douglas Hamilton. Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press,
1994.
Ethan Ilzetzki, Enrique G. Mendoza, and Carlos A. Végh. How big (small?)
are fiscal multipliers? Journal of Monetary Economics, 60:239–254, March
2013.
Òscar Jordà. Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projec-
tions. American Economic Review, 95(1):161–182, March 2005.
Eric M. Leeper, Todd B. Walker, and Shu-Chun Susan Yang. Fiscal foresight
and information flows. Econometrica, 81(3):1115–1145, 2013.
Marco Lombardi and Feng Zhu. A shadow policy rate to calibrate us mon-
etary policy at the zero lower bound. BIS Working Paper No. 425, June
2014.
J. Humberto López and Guillermo Perry. Inequality in latin america: Deter-
minants and consequences. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,
February 2008.
Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino, George Gray Molina, Wilson Jimenez, Veron-
ica Paz, Ernesto Yanez, Claudiney Pereira, Sean Higgins, John Scott, and
Miguel Jaramillo. Fiscal policy and income redistribution in latin amer-
ica: Challenging the conventional wisdom. Working Papers 1124, Tulane
University, Department of Economics, 2011.
Nora Lustig, Luis F. Lopez-Calva, and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez. Declining
Inequality in Latin America in the 2000s: The Cases of Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico. World Development, 44:129–141, 2013.
Sushanta K. Mallick and M. Sohrab Rafiq. The effect of monetary policy on
output in emu3: A sign restriction approach. Journal of Macroeconomics,
30(4):1756–1791, dec 2008.
Karel R. S. M. Mertens and Morten O. Ravn. Fiscal policy in an expectations-
driven liquidity trap. The Review of Economic Studies, Advanced access,
pages 1–31, 2014.
96
Tommaso Monacelli and Roberto Perotti. Fiscal policy, the real exchange
rate and traded goods. Economic Journal, 120(544):437–461, may 2010.
Donald P. Morgan. Asymmetric Effects of Monetary Policy. Economic Re-
view, Second quarter, pages 21–33, 1993.
Andrew Mountford and Harald Uhlig. What are the effects of fiscal policy
shocks? Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24(6):960–992, 2009.
Carlos Mulas-Granados. Fiscal Adjustments and the Short-Term Trade-Off
between economic growth and equality. Hacienda Pública Española, 172
(1):61–92, June 2005.
Michael T. Owyang, Valerie Ann Ramey, and Sarah Zubairy. Are govern-
ment spending multipliers greater during periods of slack? evidence from
twentieth-century historical data. American Economic Review, 103(3):
129–34, 2013.
Roberto Perotti. Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in oecd countries.
IGIER Working Paper No. 276, dec 2004.
Valerie A. Ramey and Matthew D. Shapiro. Costly capital reallocation and
the effects of government spending. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy 48, pages 145–194, 1998.
Valery A. Ramey. Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the
timing. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126:1–50, feb 2011.
Morten O. Ravn, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, and Martin Uribe. Explaining
the effects of government spending shocks on consumption and the real
exchange rate. NBER Working Papers, August 2007.
Christina Romer and David Romer. Does monetary policy matter: A new
test in the spirit of friedman and schwartz. NBER Working Paper No.
3045, July 1989.
Christina Romer and David Romer. The macroeconomic effects of tax
changes: Estimates based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. American
Economic Review, 100(3), 2010.
97
Christina Romer and David Romer. Transfer payments and the macroe-
conomy: The effects of social security benefit changes, 1952-1991. NBER
Working Paper No. 20087, May 2014.
B. J. Taylor. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 39:195–214, 1993.
Harald Uhlig. What are the effects of monetary policy on output? results
from an agnostic identification procedure. Journal of Monetary Economics,
52(2):381–419, mar 2005.
Michael Woodford. Simple analytics of the government expenditure multi-
plier. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(1):1–35, 2011.
World Bank Group. Shifting gears to accelerate shared prosperity in lac:
Ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in latin america
and the caribbean. Poverty and Labor Brief, 2013.
Jing Cynthia Wu and Fan Dora Xia. Measuring the macroeconomic impact
of monetary policy at the zero lower bound. NBER Working Paper No.
20117, May 2014.
98
Appendix
99
Appendix Chapter 1
Identification of the A˜ matrix
In order to easily recover the block exogeneity, A˜ is chosen as follows:
A˜ =
[
A˜11 A˜12
0 A˜22
]
The relation (1.6) in the paper can then be written as:
Ω =
[
Ω11 Ω12
Ω12
′ Ω22
]
=
[
A˜11A˜
′
11 + A˜12A˜
′
12 A˜12A˜
′
22
A˜22A˜
′
12 A˜22A˜
′
22
]
= A˜A˜
′
(A1)
— Because of the block exogeneity, A˜22 is identified solely from the lower-
right block of (A1) as the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Ω22,
which is estimated directly from the y2 sub-system and independently
of y1; see (1.4)
— Once A˜22 is identified, A˜12 is derived from the upper-right matrix in
(A1):
Ω12 = A˜12A˜
′
22 (A2)
A˜12 = Ω12
(
A˜
′
22
)−1
(A3)
— Finally, from the upper-left matrix in relation (A1), A˜11A˜
′
11 is derived:
A˜11A˜
′
11 = Ω11 − A˜12A˜
′
12 (A4)
Since the right-hand side of (A4) is symmetric and positive definite,
A˜11 is identified as the lower triangular Cholesky factor of the right-
hand side of (A4).
Identification of the impulse vectors
Using the penalty function defined in Mountford and Uhlig [2009], an impulse
vector a is identified through the following minimization:
a = argmina=A˜qΨ(a)
100
where
Ψ(a) =
∑
j∈J+
k∑
k=k
f
(
−rja(k)
sj
)
+
∑
j∈J−
k∑
k=k
f
(
rja(k)
sj
)
sj is the standard error of variable j, J+ and J− are the subsets of variables
j such that rja(k) ≥ 0, j ∈ J+ and rja(k) ≤ 0, j ∈ J−, respectively, for some
horizon k = k, .., k. The f function, which rewards large impulse responses
with the right sign and penalizes impulse responses with the wrong sign, is
given by
f(x) =
{
100x if x ≥ 0
x if else
Now consider [a1, a2], the two impulse vectors that help to identify the busi-
ness cycle shock and the fiscal policy shock, respectively (i.e. the government
spending shock and the net tax revenue shock).
a1 is identified as follows:
a1 = argmina=A˜q qi=0, i=m1+1,...,mΨ(a)
with J− = ∅, J+={Canadian GDP, Private consumption, Private invest-
ment, Tax revenue}, k = 0 and k = 3.
Once a1 is identified through the choice of q1, a2 is identified such that:
a2 = argmina=A˜q, q′q1=0, qi=0, i=m1+1,...,m Ψ(a)
with J− = ∅, J+={Government spending} or J+={Net tax revenue}, k = 0
and k = 3.
The constraints qi = 0, i = m1 + 1, ...,m allow the variables in the second
block y2 to not respond to the shock from the first block.
Sources and definitions of data
Canadian data the from the CANSIM data base:
Real GDP: Table 380-0002: row 1
Real private consumption: Table 380-0002: Sum of personal expendi-
tures on non-durables (row 5) and services (row 6)
Real private non-residential investment: Table 380-0002: Sum of total
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business GFCF (row 10) and business investment in inventories (row 15) mi-
nus residential structures (row 11)
Real government purchases: Table 380-0002: Sum of government current
expenditure on goods and services (row 7), government GFCF (row 8) and
government inventories (row 9)
Net exports to GDP ratio: Table 380-0002: is obtained as the ratio of
net exports (row 19 minus row 22) over GDP (row 1)
GDP deflator (2002=100): Table 380-0003: row 1
The labor force: Table 282-0087: row 2. Quarterly data are obtained by
taking the monthly average of each quarter. In the database, data are avail-
able from 1976. Data from 1970 to 1975 are obtained through documents
available at the Université de Montréal library.
Nominal tax revenue: Table 380-0007: Sum of taxes on income (row 2),
Social security contributions (row 6) and taxes on productions and imports
(row 7)
Transfers: Table 380-0007: Sum of transfers to persons (row 15) and trans-
fers to business (row 16)
Net tax revenue is the difference between nominal tax revenue and trans-
fers, and real net tax revenue is obtained by dividing the nominal net tax
revenue by the GDP deflator.
The three-month T-bill rate: Table 176-0043: row 34. Quarterly data
are obtained taking the average of the monthly data for each quarter.
Real per-capita variables (GDP, consumption, investment, net taxes and
government spending) are obtained by dividing data in level y by the labor
force.
The REER is from the FRED database at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/series/CCRETT02CAQ661N
U.S. real GDP: NIPA Serie ID: GDPC96
U.S. labor force participation: NIPA Series CNP16OV. Quarterly data
are obtained by taking the average of monthly data of each quarter.
U.S. GDP deflator (2005=100): NIPA Series GDPDEF. Real per-capita
GDP is obtained by dividing real GDP by the labor force.
Oil prices (Crude Oil (petroleum), West Texas Intermediate 40 API, Mid-
land Texas, U.S$ per barrel) are from the IMF World Economic Outlook
database.
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Figures
Figure A1 – Net-exports-to-GDP ratio in percentage and the REER index
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Figure A2 – IRFs to a government spending shock (1970:Q1-1990:Q4)
Notes: The green areas denote the identified sign restriction assumptions, the blue lines denote the
median impulse responses, and the shaded areas denote the 68% confidence region.
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Figure A3 – IRFs to a government spending shock (1991:Q1-2010:Q4)
Notes: The green areas denote the identified sign restriction assumptions, the blue lines denote the
median impulse responses, and the shaded areas denote the 68% confidence region.
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Figure A4 – IRFs to a net tax revenue shock (1970:Q1-1990:Q4)
Notes: The green areas denote the identified sign restriction assumptions, the blue lines denote the
median impulse responses, and the shaded areas denote the 68% confidence region.
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Figure A5 – IRFs to a net tax revenue shock (1991:Q1-2010:Q4)
Notes: The green areas denote the identified sign restriction assumptions, the blue lines denote the
median impulse responses, and the shaded areas denote the 68% confidence region.
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Appendix Chapter 2
Tables
Table A1 – GDP Cumulative and Peak Multipliers with Alternative Measures of
Inflation in the Taylor Rule
Measure of inflation 1 year 2 years 4 years Ratio of peakintegral integral integral responses
Non accommodative SPF forecast Infl. -1.55 -1.97 -0.22 2.76Accommodative 2.50 3.96 4.48 5.51
Non accommodative Quarterly CPI Infl. -1.28 -1.73 0.72 2.88Accommodative 2.47 3.90 4.15 5.25
Non accommodative Quarterly PCE Infl. -2.19 -2.93 -0.39 2.20Accommodative 2.78 4.09 4.22 5.21
Non accommodative Year/year CPI infl. -1.21 -1.62 0.54 3.47Accommodative 2.49 4.02 4.53 5.33
Non accommodative Year/year lead CPI Infl. -1.35 -2.10 -0.54 2.33Accommodative 2.73 4.36 4.60 5.87
Notes: This table provides GDP multipliers from a surprise federal spending shock across alternative measures of
inflation in the Taylor-rule. The benchmark corresponds to one-quarter ahead inflation forecast from SPF.
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Table A2 – GDP Cumulative and Peak Multipliers with Different Values of the
Smoothing Parameter, γ
γ 1 year 2 years 4 years Ratio of peakintegral integral integral responses
Non accommodative 2.5 -2.78 -4.95 -4.39 2.07Accommodative 3.00 4.60 4.75 5.55
Non accommodative 3.5 -2.12 -3.24 -1.77 2.42Accommodative 2.77 4.29 4.62 5.52
Non accommodative 5 -1.55 -1.97 -0.22 2.76Accommodative 2.50 3.96 4.48 5.51
Non accommodative 6.5 -1.21 -1.28 0.52 2.97Accommodative 2.32 3.74 4.39 5.51
Non accommodative 7.5 -1.06 -0.99 0.82 3.07Accommodative 2.24 3.64 4.35 5.52
Non accommodative 10 -0.82 -0.53 1.27 3.22Accommodative 2.10 3.47 4.28 5.53
Notes: This table provides GDP multipliers from a surprise federal spending shock across different values
of the smoothing parameter γ. Note that the lower γ is the more far apart are the two states of monetary
policy. γ = 5 corresponds to the benchmark case where monetary policy remains accommodative for
about 30 of the time in our sample period.
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Table A3 – Cumulative and Peak Sectoral Multipliers (surprise federal govern-
ment spending)
1-year 2-year 4-year Ratio of peak
integral integral integral responses
Total Consumption
Linear 0.09 0.93 2.53 2.98
Non accommodative -0.64 -0.82 -0.01 1.63
Accommodative 1.09 2.27 3.29 3.87
Cons. of durables
Linear 0.10 0.32 0.71 0.85
Non accommodative -0.16 -0.21 -0.04 0.49
Accommodative 0.43 0.76 0.85 0.99
Cons. of non durables & serv.
Linear -0.11 0.22 1.27 1.71
Non accommodative -0.57 -0.60 -0.00 0.79
Accommodative 0.47 0.91 1.69 2.43
Private fixed investment
Linear -0.26 -0.42 0.96 0.65
Non accommodative 0.11 -0.86 -1.11 2.30
Accommodative -0.17 0.02 0.22 0.91
Cumulative multipliers are computed as the ratio of the sum of responses of GDP and government spend-
ing. The peak measure is the ratio of the IRFs at their respective peaks.
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Figures
Figure A6 – Federal Spending-to-GDP Ratio (in percent) Over the Sample Period
Figure A7 – Shadow Fed Funds Rate Near the ZLB (2008Q1-2012Q4)
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Figure A8 – IRFs of Federal Government Spending and Output to Federal Gov-
ernment Spending Shocks Using the Cholesky Decomposition
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Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence bands around the estimates.
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Figure A9 – IRFs of Private Investment (SPF/Greenbook)
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Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence bands around estimates.
Figure A10 – IRFs of Federal Debt (SPF/Greenbook)
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Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence regions around estimates.
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Figure A11 – IRFs of Output (SPF/Greenbook): Extended Sample Through
2012Q4
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Notes: Shaded areas represent the 95 percent confidence regions around estimates.
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Figure A12 – IRFs of Employment at Times of Slack (SPF/Greenbook): Ex-
tended Sample, Including the ZLB Episode
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Figure A13 – The Fed Funds Rate, the Shadow Fed Funds Rate, and the Likeli-
hood of Being in the Accommodative State (extended sample, including the recent
ZLB episode)
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Figure A14 – Historical Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers Over the Sample Period
Notes: The multiplier in each quarter is cumulative over 16 quarters ahead
(4-year integral).
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Appendix Chapter 3
Tables
Table A4 – Years of fiscal expansions and fiscal consolidations
Fiscal expansions Fiscal consolidations
Argentina 1993, 96, 05, 09 1992, 97, 00, 02, 04
Bolivia 1999, 01, 02, 07, 08 1997, 05, 06
Brazil 1998, 02, 06, 09 1999
Chile 1998, 00, 09 1994, 96, 06
Colombia 2002, 09 2000, 03, 10
Costa Rica 1992, 93, 94, 00, 08, 09 1991, 95, 96, 99, 01, 03, 05
Dominican Rep. 2001, 08 2004, 05, 09
Ecuador 1995, 07, 08 1999, 00, 06, 09, 10
Guatemala 2003 2002, 04
Honduras 1992, 93, 96, 97, 99, 01, 05, 07,08, 09 1991, 94, 95, 98, 04
Mexico 1994, 96, 00, 04, 05, 06, 08 2010
Nicaragua 2001 2005
Panama 2003, 04, 10 1995, 06
Paraguay 1995, 99, 05, 09 2001, 02, 03, 04, 08, 10
Peru 1999, 04, 09 2001, 02, 03, 06, 10
El Salvador 1996, 01, 08, 09 1995, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06
Uruguay 1995, 98, 00, 04, 07, 10 1996, 02, 03, 05, 06
Venezuela, RB 1998, 01, 03, 06 1999, 02, 04, 05
Table A5 – Average changes in percent of GDP of the cyclically adjusted primary
deficit and its main components
PRIM. CONSUMP. CAPITAL TRANSFERS
EXPENSES EXP. EXP. AND SUBS.
ALL 0.35 0.06 0.09 0.21
(0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
EXPANSION 1.33 0.35 0.45 0.53
(0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
ADJUSTMENT -0.66 -0.24 -0.21 -0.20
(0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Notes: This table displays the average changes in the cyclically adjusted primary expenses and its main
components for the sample-period and during episodes of fiscal expansions and fiscal consolidations.
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Table A6 – Average changes in percent of GDP of the cyclically tax revenue and
its main components
TOTAL DIRECT INDIRECT SOCIAL
TAX REV. TAX REV. TAX REV. SEC. CONTR.
ALL 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
EXPANSION -0.13 -0.03 -0.11 0.01
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
ADJUSTMENT 0.52 0.25 0.29 -0.03
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
Notes: This table displays the average changes in the cyclically adjusted primary expenses and its main
components for the sample-period and during episodes of fiscal expansions and fiscal consolidations.
Table A7 – Household surveys data availability
First year Last year Total obervations
Argentina 1991 2010 20
Bolivia 1991 2008 11
Brazil 1990 2009 17
Chile 1990 2009 9
Colombia 1992 2010 12
Costa Rica 1990 2010 20
Dominican Rep. 1992 2010 13
Ecuador 1994 2010 12
Guatemala 1998 2006 5
Honduras 1991 2009 19
Mexico 1992 2010 11
Nicaragua 1993 2005 4
Panama 1991 2010 12
Paraguay 1990 2010 14
Peru 1994 2010 15
El Salvador 1991 2009 14
Uruguay 1992 2010 16
Venezuela, RB 1992 2006 10
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Table A8 – Effects of fiscal expansion on the income growth of the bottom 40
percent(robustness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPD 0.022∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.022∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Lag ∆CAPD -0.008
(0.008)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.117 0.178 0.174 0.167 0.192
(0.086) (0.108) (0.113) (0.122) (0.120)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.324∗ 0.334∗∗ 0.341∗ 0.358∗∗ 0.394∗∗
(0.165) (0.157) (0.170) (0.157) (0.163)
∆ln(GDP deflator) 0.040 -0.265 -0.256 -0.263 -0.328
(0.226) (0.193) (0.197) (0.202) (0.190)
∆ln(Real Export) 0.013 -0.038 -0.035 -0.093 -0.051
(0.105) (0.113) (0.114) (0.142) (0.127)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 0.757 0.737 0.734 0.621 1.014
(1.274) (1.257) (1.238) (1.318) (1.327)
∆Prim. expend. 0.025∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009)
∆Tax revenues -0.016 -0.020
(0.030) (0.028)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.103∗∗∗
(0.024)
∆Capital expend. -0.011
(0.023)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.020∗∗
(0.008)
∆Direct taxes -0.068∗∗
(0.031)
∆Indirect taxes 0.049
(0.032)
∆SSC 0.042
(0.031)
Constant 0.135 0.114∗∗∗ 0.085 0.116 0.126 0.136 0.135 0.098 0.097 -0.193∗∗∗ 0.106
(0.218) (0.024) (0.209) (0.217) (0.212) (0.220) (0.219) (0.214) (0.213) (0.051) (0.214)
R-squared 0.249 0.262 0.269 0.266 0.249 0.253 0.250 0.296 0.297 0.348 0.325
No.Obs 210 190 210 208 210 209 210 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal expansion on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent. Episodes of fiscal expansion
are identified as periods during which the CAPD increases by at least 1 percent of GDP. All fiscal variables are expressed as share
of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-added, export, U.S. GDP and inflation
rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table A9 – Effects of fiscal contraction on the income growth of the bottom 40
percent(robustness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPB -0.009 -0.014 -0.010 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.016
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Lag ∆CAPB -0.000
(0.011)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.117 0.183 0.175 0.171 0.203
(0.093) (0.114) (0.115) (0.124) (0.124)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.301∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.387∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.406∗∗
(0.157) (0.147) (0.170) (0.139) (0.167)
∆ln(GDP deflator) 0.028 -0.284 -0.269 -0.318 -0.345
(0.246) (0.204) (0.216) (0.220) (0.212)
∆ln(Real Export) -0.014 -0.066 -0.101 -0.132 -0.115
(0.096) (0.108) (0.127) (0.149) (0.145)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 0.751 0.815 0.890 0.838 1.161
(1.218) (1.212) (1.235) (1.220) (1.349)
∆Prim. expend. 0.031 0.031
(0.019) (0.020)
∆Tax revenues 0.026 0.006
(0.025) (0.023)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.015
(0.038)
∆Capital expend. 0.023
(0.026)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.014
(0.045)
∆Direct taxes 0.031
(0.033)
∆Indirect taxes 0.013
(0.030)
∆SSC 0.055
(0.106)
Constant 0.159 0.134∗∗∗ 0.113 0.159 0.154 0.167 0.160 0.147 0.143 -0.155∗∗ 0.155
(0.228) (0.046) (0.223) (0.230) (0.222) (0.231) (0.229) (0.232) (0.231) (0.066) (0.238)
No.Obs 210 190 210 208 210 209 210 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal consolidation on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent. Episodes of fiscal
expansion are identified as periods during which the CAPD increases by at least 1 percent of GDP. All fiscal variables are
expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-added, export,
U.S. GDP and inflation rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported
in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table A10 – Effects of fiscal expansion on consumption growth of the bottom 40
percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPD 0.021∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Lag ∆CAPD 0.002
(0.008)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.098 0.120 0.113 0.122 0.121
(0.095) (0.121) (0.122) (0.130) (0.125)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.203∗ 0.217∗ 0.230∗ 0.231∗ 0.316∗∗
(0.105) (0.109) (0.120) (0.123) (0.125)
∆ln(GDP deflator) 0.112 -0.098 -0.087 -0.107 -0.152
(0.187) (0.182) (0.182) (0.189) (0.183)
∆ln(Real Export) 0.007 -0.028 -0.023 -0.016 -0.019
(0.123) (0.139) (0.141) (0.158) (0.142)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 0.910 0.887 0.942 0.974 0.630
(1.216) (1.185) (1.181) (1.278) (1.272)
∆Prim. expend. 0.024∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
∆Tax revenues -0.007 -0.010
(0.024) (0.024)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.073∗∗∗
(0.025)
∆Capital expend. 0.002
(0.016)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.017
(0.014)
∆Direct taxes -0.049∗∗
(0.022)
∆Indirect taxes 0.041
(0.024)
∆SSC 0.004
(0.023)
Constant 0.123 0.057 0.081 0.111 0.099 0.124 0.123 0.082 0.081 -0.083 0.092
(0.122) (0.039) (0.114) (0.122) (0.122) (0.124) (0.122) (0.124) (0.124) (0.049) (0.131)
No.Obs 210 190 210 208 210 209 210 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal expansion on consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent. All fiscal variables are
expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-added, export, U.S.
GDP and inflation rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table A11 – Effects of fiscal contraction on consumption growth of the bottom
40 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆CAPB -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Lag ∆CAPB -0.001
(0.005)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.099 0.126 0.128 0.129 0.137
(0.101) (0.127) (0.126) (0.130) (0.130)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.155 0.187∗ 0.180∗ 0.179 0.204∗
(0.097) (0.106) (0.102) (0.112) (0.100)
∆ln(GDP deflator) 0.098 -0.122 -0.130 -0.178 -0.158
(0.206) (0.196) (0.187) (0.208) (0.192)
∆ln(Real Export) -0.032 -0.067 -0.068 -0.065 -0.064
(0.129) (0.148) (0.148) (0.166) (0.156)
∆ln(U.S. RGDP ) 1.008 1.109 1.093 1.247 0.925
(1.222) (1.172) (1.181) (1.106) (1.182)
∆Prim. expend. 0.008 0.011
(0.010) (0.013)
∆Tax revenues -0.015 -0.005
(0.016) (0.014)
∆Gov. Consump. 0.007
(0.023)
∆Capital expend. -0.007
(0.017)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.009
(0.016)
∆Direct taxes -0.013
(0.016)
∆Indirect taxes -0.028
(0.024)
∆SSC -0.023
(0.045)
Constant 0.138 0.087∗∗ 0.099 0.136 0.117 0.145 0.138 0.116 0.116 -0.055 0.131
(0.135) (0.031) (0.127) (0.135) (0.133) (0.141) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.046) (0.141)
No.Obs 210 190 210 208 210 209 210 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table displays the effects of fiscal consolidation on consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent. All fiscal
variables are expressed as share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-
added, export, U.S. GDP and inflation rate, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by
country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table A12 – Effects of fiscal expansion on the Gini index growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆CAPD -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Lag ∆CAPD -0.002
(0.003)
∆ln(RGDP ) -0.136 -0.180∗ -0.170∗ -0.153 -0.154
(0.087) (0.092) (0.090) (0.100) (0.101)
∆ln(Real M2) -0.035 -0.030 -0.027 -0.027 -0.026
(0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034)
∆ln(Real Agri) -0.027 -0.024 -0.033 -0.031 -0.046
(0.050) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.063)
∆ln(Real Export) 0.036 0.071 0.065 0.048 0.067
(0.047) (0.052) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049)
∆Prim. expend. -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
∆Tax revenues 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.006)
∆Gov. Consump. -0.032∗∗∗
(0.008)
∆Capital expend. 0.001
(0.005)
∆Transfert & subs. -0.011∗∗
(0.005)
∆Direct taxes 0.015∗
(0.008)
∆Indirect taxes -0.012
(0.008)
∆SSC 0.007
(0.011)
Constant -0.041 -0.004 -0.041 -0.027 -0.040 -0.043 -0.028 -0.029 0.037∗ -0.029
(0.051) (0.011) (0.050) (0.045) (0.051) (0.051) (0.044) (0.044) (0.018) (0.045)
No.Obs 210 190 210 210 208 209 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table reports the effects of fiscal expansion on the Gini index growth rate. All fiscal variables are expressed as share of
GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: GDP, M2, agriculture value-added, export, as well as countries
and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by group are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table A13 – Effects of fiscal contraction on the Gini index growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆CAPB 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Lag ∆CAPB -0.000
(0.002)
∆ln(RGDP ) -0.134 -0.198∗∗ -0.222∗∗ -0.199∗ -0.233∗∗
(0.089) (0.088) (0.092) (0.095) (0.093)
∆ln(Real M2) -0.035 -0.029 -0.029 -0.026 -0.028
(0.038) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
∆ln(Real Agri) -0.003 -0.005 0.006 0.004 0.009
(0.054) (0.062) (0.062) (0.068) (0.062)
∆ln(Real Export) 0.052 0.087 0.093∗ 0.083 0.096
(0.050) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058)
∆Prim. expend. 0.000 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
∆Tax revenues 0.008 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
∆Gov. Consump. -0.003
(0.009)
∆Capital expend. 0.003
(0.010)
∆Transfert & subs. 0.003
(0.006)
∆Direct taxes 0.003
(0.007)
∆Indirect taxes 0.013∗
(0.007)
∆SSC 0.020
(0.015)
Constant -0.043 -0.017 -0.041 -0.029 -0.045 -0.049 -0.037 -0.036 0.032∗ -0.043
(0.056) (0.010) (0.055) (0.050) (0.056) (0.058) (0.050) (0.049) (0.017) (0.051)
No.Obs 210 190 210 210 208 209 208 208 197 206
No.countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Notes: This table reports the effects of fiscal consolidation on the Gini index growth rate. All fiscal variables are expressed as
share of GDP and are cyclically-adjusted. Controls include real growth of: GDP, M2, agriculture value-added, export, as well
as countries and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table A14 – Effects of fiscal expansion(columns 1-4) and fiscal contraction(columns 5-8)
on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent (correcting fiscal variables from potential
endogeneity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.200 0.205 0.197 0.224 0.210∗ 0.206∗ 0.197 0.227∗
(0.121) (0.127) (0.145) (0.129) (0.109) (0.110) (0.129) (0.116)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.404∗ 0.396∗ 0.352∗ 0.491∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.413∗∗ 0.304∗ 0.424∗∗
(0.206) (0.220) (0.189) (0.222) (0.180) (0.186) (0.172) (0.181)
∆ln(GDP deflator) -0.347 -0.356 -0.375 -0.423∗∗ -0.328 -0.313 -0.364 -0.416∗
(0.227) (0.228) (0.230) (0.184) (0.221) (0.233) (0.280) (0.220)
∆ln(Real Export) -0.041 -0.049 -0.074 -0.068 -0.153 -0.147 -0.111 -0.138
(0.212) (0.206) (0.190) (0.197) (0.220) (0.223) (0.219) (0.256)
∆CAPD ×Dexp 0.036∗∗
(0.013)
∆Prim. expend.×Dexp. 0.035∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
∆Tax revenues×Dexp. -0.045 -0.044
(0.030) (0.031)
∆Gov. Consump.×Dexp. 0.109∗∗∗
(0.021)
∆Capital expend.×Dexp. -0.015
(0.019)
∆Transfert & subs.×Dexp. 0.026∗
(0.014)
∆Direct taxes×Dexp. -0.094∗∗
(0.040)
∆Indirect taxes×Dexp. 0.034
(0.022)
∆SSC ×Dexp. -0.042
(0.035)
∆CAPB ×Dcont. -0.045∗∗
(0.017)
∆Prim. expend.×Dcont. 0.051∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.020)
∆Tax revenues×Dcont. -0.034∗ -0.021
(0.017) (0.016)
∆Gov. Consump.×Dcont. 0.060
(0.050)
∆Capital expend.×Dcont. 0.012
(0.015)
∆Transfert & subs.×Dcont. 0.034
(0.029)
∆Direct taxes×Dcont. -0.017
(0.018)
∆Indirect taxes×Dcont. -0.046
(0.027)
∆SSC ×Dcont. -0.140∗
(0.078)
Constant 0.105 0.106 -0.191∗∗∗ 0.117 0.227 0.227 -0.097∗ 0.275
(0.225) (0.225) (0.053) (0.234) (0.232) (0.235) (0.053) (0.241)
No.Obs 159 159 150 157 159 159 150 157
No.countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Notes: This table reports the effects of fiscal expansion and fiscal contraction on the income growth of the bottom 40
percent. All fiscal variables expressed as share of GDP are cyclically-adjusted and corrected from potential endogeneity.
Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-added, export, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
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Table A15 – Effects of fiscal expansion(columns 1-4) and fiscal contraction(columns
5-8) on the income share growth of the bottom 40 percent (correcting fiscal variables from
potential endogeneity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ln(Real GDP ) 0.364 0.360 0.328 0.295 0.417∗ 0.512∗∗ 0.466∗∗ 0.415
(0.228) (0.226) (0.240) (0.252) (0.218) (0.215) (0.216) (0.254)
∆ln(Real M2) 0.103 0.101 0.105 0.104 0.111 0.109 0.109 0.100
(0.089) (0.091) (0.106) (0.094) (0.092) (0.091) (0.096) (0.092)
∆ln(Real Agri) 0.081 0.088 0.073 0.141 0.050 0.006 -0.042 0.013
(0.127) (0.135) (0.111) (0.145) (0.119) (0.112) (0.124) (0.114)
∆ln(Real Export) -0.176 -0.168 -0.147 -0.161 -0.259∗ -0.287∗ -0.226 -0.224
(0.137) (0.131) (0.122) (0.121) (0.145) (0.142) (0.138) (0.164)
∆CAPD ×Dexp 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009)
∆Prim. expend.×Dexp. 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
∆Tax revenues×Dexp. -0.020 -0.016
(0.023) (0.028)
∆Gov. Consump.×Dexp. 0.090∗∗∗
(0.024)
∆Capital expend.×Dexp. -0.012
(0.016)
∆Transfert & subs.×Dexp. 0.023∗
(0.011)
∆Direct taxes×Dexp. -0.048
(0.029)
∆Indirect taxes×Dexp. 0.036
(0.021)
∆SSC ×Dexp. -0.058
(0.038)
∆CAPB ×Dcont. -0.028∗∗
(0.012)
∆Prim. expend.×Dcont. 0.018 0.027∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008)
∆Tax revenues×Dcont. -0.048∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.015) (0.012)
∆Gov. Consump.×Dcont. 0.039
(0.023)
∆Capital expend.×Dcont. -0.015
(0.023)
∆Transfert & subs.×Dcont. 0.009
(0.015)
∆Direct taxes×Dcont. -0.032
(0.020)
∆Indirect taxes×Dcont. -0.044∗∗
(0.016)
∆SSC ×Dcont. -0.135∗∗
(0.046)
Constant 0.063 0.063 -0.086∗ 0.062 0.143 0.142 -0.020 0.154
(0.104) (0.104) (0.046) (0.106) (0.114) (0.110) (0.047) (0.110)
No.Obs 159 159 150 157 159 159 150 157
No.countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Notes: This table reports the effects of fiscal expansion and fiscal contraction on the income growth of the bottom 40
percent. All fiscal variables expressed as share of GDP are cyclically-adjusted and corrected from potential endogeneity.
Controls include real growth of: M2, agriculture value-added, export, as well as countries and years fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
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Figures
Figure A15 – Cyclicality of the primary deficit and unemployment rate
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Notes: This figures portrays correlations between GDP growth and the primary deficit and between
GDP growth and unemployment rate.
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